Political Silence at Church: The Empty Threat of Removing Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial Attempts To Influence Legislation by Andersen, David M.
BYU Law Review
Volume 2006 | Issue 1 Article 3
3-1-2006
Political Silence at Church: The Empty Threat of
Removing Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial
Attempts To Influence Legislation
David M. Andersen
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Religion Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
David M. Andersen, Political Silence at Church: The Empty Threat of Removing Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial Attempts To Influence
Legislation, 2006 BYU L. Rev. 115 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2006/iss1/3




Political Silence at Church: The Empty Threat of 
Removing Tax-Exempt Status for Insubstantial 
Attempts To Influence Legislation 
“Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, 
religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that 
man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these 
great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of 
men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, 
ought to respect and to cherish them.”1
I. INTRODUCTION 
Espionage, political threats, and infiltration of private societies 
are activities more seemingly identified as plot elements in the latest 
Tom Clancy thriller or The Da Vinci Code2 than as unfortunate 
byproducts of an ambiguous tax code. Churches struggling to find a 
voice in modern public policy debates, however, claim that these are 
real tactics utilized by groups seeking to enforce extreme 
interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code’s political speech 
restrictions against tax-exempt organizations.3 Some of these groups 
have gone to the extreme of planting spies within churches to 
immediately report to the IRS whenever clergymen address policy 
issues and admonish churchgoers to take action on those issues.4
 1. George Washington, Farewell Address to the Nation, Philadelphia (Sept. 17, 1796), 
available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing.htm. 
 2. DAN BROWN, THE DA VINCI CODE (2003). 
 3. The tax code outlines two basic political speech restrictions against certain tax-exempt 
organizations: (1) limitations on attempts to “influence legislation” and (2) an outright ban on 
political campaigning for or against candidates. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 4. See, e.g., Tresa Baldas, A Bully Pulpit, or Bullying the Pulpit, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 18, 
2004, at 22 (“[R]eligious watchdogs are monitoring churches closely, in some cases hiding out 
in pews and spying on pastors . . . .”); Hank Merges, Pastors Bound to Rules if Backing 
Candidates, YORK DISPATCH, July 29, 2004 (explaining that “left-wing groups are suddenly 
springing into action . . . sending ‘spies’ into churches on Sunday mornings”); Mathew D. 
Staver, Pastors, Churches and Politics: What May Pastors and Churches Do?, LIBERTY COUNSEL, 
http://www.lc.org/Resources/pastors_churches_politics.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2006) 
(reporting the story of Kansas pastors who received threats that a group known as 
MAINstream Coalition would send spies into churches on a particular day). 
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Those opposed to tax-exempt churches having a role in the 
political realm view such actions by religious leaders as clear 
violations of a church’s tax-exempt status.5 At the opposite end of 
the spectrum are those who support the right of churches to speak 
out on political issues unfettered by intervention from the IRS or any 
other organization.6 Thus, in the modern development of fair and 
just tax policy, two competing visions have emerged as polar 
extremes7 in the debate over the relationship between the tax-exempt 
status of churches and their political advocacy efforts. 
Couched somewhere between these two extremes is § 501(c)(3) 
of the Internal Revenue Code, which places two restrictions on the 
political speech and activities of tax-exempt organizations.8 The first 
A possibility even more troublesome than private groups observing religious meetings to 
prevent political speech would be government officers infiltrating churches for the same 
purpose: “Policing would require monitoring sermons, a proposition that conjures images of 
government moles serving as church spies and state officials with notepads scribbling down 
Sunday quotes from the front pews, effectively creating the most extreme form of day-to-day 
evaluation of religion . . . .” Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God Speaks to a 
King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton Administration, 
63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 391, 404 (2000). 
 5. In 1998, for example, Americans United for the Separation of Church and State 
mailed 80,000 letters to pastors across the nation warning them that churches risked losing 
tax-exempt status if they distributed voter guides prepared by the Christian Coalition. See 
Laurie Goodstein, The 1998 Campaign: Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1998, at A27.  
 6. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr., Guidelines for Political Activities by Pastors and Churches, 
Sept. 2004, http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/userdocs/GuidelinesforChurchesandPastors.pdf 
(explaining that “for people of faith, it is theologically incoherent to require them to 
disconnect their faith from their political lives”). 
 7. This analysis labels these positions as “extremes” for purposes of drawing policy 
comparisons only. This label does not suggest that these positions are radical or that they are 
the most extreme interpretations of issues regarding the tax-exempt status of churches. For 
example, some would argue that any taxation of churches is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Glenn 
Goodwin, Would Caesar Tax God? The Constitutionality of the Governmental Taxation of 
Churches, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 383, 403–04 (1986). See generally DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY 
CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES (1977) (providing an in-depth argument for the 
unconstitutionality of church taxation). At the opposite extreme are those who claim the tax-
exempt status of churches is an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The ACLU, for 
example, has opposed tax exemptions for churches altogether. See WILLIAM A. DONAHUE, 
TWILIGHT OF LIBERTY: THE LEGACY OF THE ACLU 98–99 (1994). This analysis focuses on 
two different extremes—those who believe tax-exempt churches should not be able to engage 
in political activity and those who argue that tax-exempt churches should be able to engage in 
any type of political speech. 
 8. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (outlining the requirements that “[c]orporations, and 
any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious [or 
other charitable] purposes” must fulfill to retain tax-exempt status). While these requirements 
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is a more limited restriction mandating that “no substantial part of [a 
501(c)(3) organization’s] activities” may consist of “carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”9 The 
second restriction mandates that 501(c)(3) organizations may “not 
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or 
distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office.”10 These two 
restrictions have caused great concern to parties on both sides of the 
issue—some arguing that the restrictions do not go far enough to 
separate churches from the political arena and others arguing that 
these restrictions are an unconstitutional burden on religion. 
The bulk of modern attention in this area has centered on the 
political campaign ban while giving only lip service to the restriction 
against “substantial” attempts to influence legislation. This one-sided 
focus of commentators11 and legislators12 likely stems from not only 
the increased political activity of churches during recent presidential 
elections13 but also the relative harshness of the political campaign 
apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations whether religious or nonreligious, this analysis examines 
the specific effects that these restrictions have on churches. 
 9. Id. Although the restriction against substantial attempts to influence legislation 
commonly has been referred to as the “lobbying restriction,” this analysis refers to the 
restriction in the plural as “lobbying restrictions” because of the various limitations this 
language in the Code might impose. These possible limitations are discussed infra Part II.B. 
 10. Id. This restriction will be referred to herein as the “political campaign ban.” 
 11. The vast majority of scholars have focused more on the political campaign ban than 
the restriction on attempts to influence legislation. See, e.g., Erik J. Ablin, The Price of Not 
Rendering to Caesar: Restrictions on Church Participation in Political Campaigns, 13 NOTRE 
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 541 (1999); Douglas H. Cook, The Politically Active 
Church, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457 (2004); Alan L. Feld, Rendering unto Caesar or 
Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for Participation in Electoral Politics, 
42 B.C. L. REV. 931 (2001); Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate—
Never the Twain Shall Meet?, 1 PITT. TAX. REV. 35 (2003); Patrick L. O’Daniel, More Honored 
in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the Permeable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by 
Churches, 42 B.C. L. REV. 733 (2001). 
 12. Recently proposed legislation would have repealed the political campaign ban on 
churches but not the restrictions against attempts to influence legislation. The Houses of 
Worship Free Speech Restoration Act sought to remove sermons or other religious speech 
during religious services or gatherings from the scope of the political campaign ban, but the 
Act would not have modified the lobbying restriction. See H.R. 235, 108th Cong. (2003). In 
1996, however, the Crane-Rangel Amendment would have amended both restrictions by 
imposing an expenditure-to-revenue ratio limit of five percent on political campaign spending 
and twenty percent on lobbying spending for all 501(c)(3) organizations. See H.R. 2910, 
104th Cong. (1996). 
 13. Recently, the IRS began an investigation of sixty tax-exempt organizations 
(including twenty churches) for alleged violations of the campaign prohibition during the 
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ban versus the lobbying restrictions.14 Further, many view the 
constitutionality of the lobbying restrictions against 501(c)(3) 
organizations as settled law after the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington.15 However, to 
this day, the IRS has never revoked the tax-exempt status of a church 
solely for having a substantial amount of its activities dedicated to 
influencing legislation.16 Nonetheless, groups opposed to the 
political activity by churches continue to threaten religious entities 
with revocation of tax-exempt status for speaking out on social policy 
issues and urging members to take action in support of church 
positions.17
The lack of aggressive enforcement by the IRS and continued 
threats against churches demonstrate that a number of lingering 
questions still cloud the definition of permissible church conduct in 
attempting to shape public policy: (1) How much of a church’s 
activities, labor, and funds can it devote to influencing legislation 
and still retain its tax-exempt status? (2) Do the lobbying restrictions 
have any influence on the relationship and communication between a 
church and its members? (3) To what extent may churches engage 
in—or encourage their members to engage in—the direct lobbying 
of policy makers? and (4) What are the legal implications of a church 
2004 election cycle. See Guy Taylor, Probe Continues of 60 Tax-exempt Groups, IRS Says, 
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2005, at A6, available at http://washingtontimes.com/national/ 
20051109-115328-3741r.htm. 
 14. Churches may lose their tax-exempt status for any single instance of political 
campaigning, including endorsement of or opposition to candidates. See, e.g., Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (affirming the IRS’s revocation of 
Branch Ministries’s tax-exempt status for advertising against Bill Clinton during his presidential 
campaign). However, churches will retain tax-exempt status for having only an “insubstantial” 
portion of their activities consist of attempts to influence legislation. 
 15. 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (upholding the revocation of a nonreligious 501(c)(3) 
organization’s tax-exempt status for engaging in substantial political campaigning as well as 
dedicating a significant amount of time and resources to influence legislation). See infra notes 
66–73 and accompanying text for a discussion of Regan. 
 16. The IRS has revoked the tax-exempt status of religious entities violating the political 
speech restrictions in two circumstances: (1) churches that engage in clear political 
campaigning in favor of or opposition to candidates, see Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d at 139, 
and (2) religious entities that engage in both substantial lobbying and political campaigning, 
see Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1972); 
see also Murphy, supra note 11, at 67 (“The revocation of Branch Ministries’ tax-exempt status 
in 1995 was the first time in history that the IRS had revoked a bona-fide church’s tax-exempt 
status.”). However, the IRS has never revoked a bona-fide church’s tax-exempt status 
exclusively for violating the lobbying restrictions. 
 17. See supra notes 4–5. 
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taking a particular stance on a public policy issue or piece of 
legislation and urging its members to be politically supportive of that 
stance? These unresolved questions reinforce the continuing reality 
that “[t]he intersection of free political debate, tax-exempt status, 
and free exercise of religion is littered with legal uncertainty.”18
This analysis scrutinizes the policy behind the restriction that 
churches “must not devote a substantial part of their activities to 
attempting to influence legislation”19 and presents a practical 
approach to interpreting this restriction. Ultimately, this analysis 
concludes that the IRS does have some interest in providing 
oversight to secure the revenue system against those who would use 
the tax-exempt status of a religious entity to promote a purely 
nonreligious political agenda.20 However, that interest should never 
override, infringe, or even influence the religious freedom of 
churches and their members to act individually or collectively in 
speaking out on issues of religious and moral concern. To do so 
would amount to using the public coffer to finance the shaping of 
religious beliefs, or at a bare minimum, the offering of a tax benefit 
to keep those beliefs from influencing public policy. 
This Comment argues that a proper interpretation of the 
lobbying restrictions should never control or attempt to define the 
proper relationship between a church and its members. Specifically, 
Congress, the IRS, and courts should clarify or otherwise narrowly 
interpret the lobbying restrictions to allow churches to speak out on 
important issues of public policy and communicate freely with 
church members regarding those issues. As part of the right to 
participate in critical religious and moral debates, churches must be 
allowed to advance their religious mission by educating and 
 18. Steven B. Imhoof, The Politics of Politicking Under IRC § 501(c)(3): A Guide for 
Politically Active Churches, 5 NEXUS 97, 98 (Fall 2000). 
 19. IRS, TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 5 (2003) 
[hereinafter TAX GUIDE], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf. 
 20. Note that this valid interest underlying the lobbying restrictions cannot be 
accomplished by mere application of the IRS’s current guidelines for whether an organization 
constitutes a “church.” See id. at 23 (listing the several factors developed by the IRS and courts 
to determine whether an organization is in fact a church). The central concern underlying the 
lobbying restrictions is not whether an organization is a church; rather, the strongest policy 
argument in favor of the restrictions is that churches might use their tax-exempt status to 
engage in politically partisan activities that have nothing to do with their religious mission, and 
which constitute a “substantial part” of their overall activities. While this purpose may be valid, 
if interpreted too broadly, the lobbying restrictions would substantially curtail the ability of 
churches to accomplish a mission that is entirely religious. 
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encouraging members to get involved politically on these issues. 
Such an interpretation would preserve both the sanctity of the 
church/member relationship and the valuable stabilizing influence 
that religion provides in the development of public policy. 
Part II of this analysis presents a background of the lobbying 
restrictions and then examines the current status of the restrictions 
by looking to both the IRS’s interpretation of the restrictions and 
judicial precedent. After surveying the competing policies behind the 
lobbying restrictions, Part III argues for a narrow interpretation of 
the lobbying restrictions that would protect fundamental religious 
freedoms—particularly, the right of churches to communicate freely 
with church members regarding critical moral issues in society and 
educate them on how to get involved in shaping public policy. 
Finally, in Part IV, this Comment explores a real-life application of 
the lobbying restrictions through the lens of the past and present 
experiences of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in 
attempting to influence public policy on issues of religious and moral 
concern. Part V offers a brief conclusion. 
II. THE TAX-EXEMPT STATUS OF CHURCHES AND THE PROBLEMS 
OF THE RESTRICTIONS AGAINST INFLUENCING LEGISLATION 
Although many churches are not politically active and remain 
neutral as to political candidates and parties, these churches often 
fulfill their religious mission by adopting strong positions on public 
policy issues and employing a range of direct and indirect lobbying 
efforts to promote these positions. To these religious entities, the tax 
code’s restrictions on attempts to influence legislation are potentially 
much more harmful than even a complete ban on political 
campaigning. This potential for greater harm exists because the 
lobbying restrictions directly control the central means by which 
many churches and their members act on religious convictions to 
influence public policy.21 Further, the lobbying restrictions more 
directly involve a government determination of when religious beliefs 
stray from legally permissible religious actions and therefore raise 
 21. Generally, churches seek to influence legislation as a part of their religious mission 
to promote moral and religious values in society. In doing so, churches see themselves more as 
religious advocates than as political players. Still, the lobbying restrictions inhibit one of the 
most effective methods of fulfilling a church’s religious mission: lobbying to change, abolish, 
or preserve the law. 
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greater questions of government infringement upon religious 
freedom than does the political campaign ban.22 With this 
understanding in mind, this Part explores the origins, development, 
and current interpretations of the lobbying restrictions as applied to 
the tax-exempt status of churches. 
A. The Tax-Exempt Status of Churches and the 
Origins of the Political Speech Restrictions 
1. Tax-exempt status of a 501(c)(3) organization 
A 501(c)(3) organization is a nonprofit entity that is exempt 
from paying taxes under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Tax-exempt status essentially refers to two concurrent conditions 
that exist as long as these organizations do not violate the tax code’s 
restrictions: (1) these organizations are generally exempt from paying 
taxes23 and (2) those who donate to these organizations may receive 
a deduction for their contribution.24 Distinguishing these two 
conditions is critical because each raises different policy concerns 
when evaluating the relationship between tax-exempt status and the 
current political speech restrictions.25 Much of the case law in this 
 22. This argument assumes, of course, that churches may more easily attach their 
religious beliefs to answer questions related to modern public policy debates than they can to 
specific political candidates or even candidates’ agendas. 
 23. Although the nonprofit activities of churches are generally exempt, certain profit-
making activities may be subject to the Unrelated Business Income Tax (“UBIT”). See TAX 
GUIDE, supra note 19, at 12–13 (explaining the general requirements for churches subject to 
UBIT) (“Churches and religious organizations . . . may engage in income-producing activities 
unrelated to their tax-exempt purposes, as long as the unrelated activities are not a substantial 
part of the organization’s activities. However, the net income from such activities will be 
subject to the UBIT if [certain] conditions are met.”); see also IRS, TAX ON UNRELATED 
BUSINESS INCOME OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2005), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p598.pdf. 
 24. The tax code provides a charitable deduction of up to fifty percent of an individual’s 
taxable income for contributions to “a church or a convention or association of churches.” 
I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2000). The deduction provision also includes the same political speech 
restrictions as section 501(c)(3). See id. § 170(c)(2)(D) (allowing a deduction only for 
contributions to an organization “which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 
501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, 
or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign 
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public office”). 
 25. For example, a 501(c)(4) organization, also known as “a social welfare 
organization” is also tax-exempt, but contributions to a 501(c)(4) entity are not tax 
deductible. Id. § 501(c)(4). However, “a section 501(c)(4) organization may engage in 
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area arises under the deduction category because individual taxpayers 
have the burden of proving that tax-exempt entities qualify as such.26
Congress has afforded churches significant tax benefits that are 
not available to other traditional nonprofit organizations. Foremost 
among these benefits is the fact that churches automatically qualify 
for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3).27 As a result, the tax code 
does not require them to apply for and obtain formal recognition of 
their tax-exempt status.28 Thus, by traditional default, churches are 
generally not part of the federal tax base.29 In addition to automatic 
tax-exempt status, churches enjoy other tax privileges. For example, 
churches are subject to less stringent annual reporting and filing 
virtually unlimited lobbying activities, so long as those activities promote social welfare.” Cook, 
supra note 11, at 464–65. Because “social welfare” is broadly defined, Professor Cook suggests 
that a church may still engage in substantial political lobbying by forming a separate 501(c)(4) 
organization in addition to its 501(c)(3) organization, thus allowing the church to separate its 
religious and its political activities and still retain tax-exempt status. Id. at 473–78. The 
problem with this suggestion, however, is that although the IRS might classify particular 
activities as “political lobbying,” churches instead see their efforts as an advancement of their 
religious mission. Creating two separate entities, one for “religious” and one for “political” 
activities in essence would require the church to admit that the issues with which it is 
concerned are for the most part political rather than religious. Thus, the struggle continues as 
to whether Congress, the IRS, or churches are the proper party to make such a distinction. See 
infra notes 46–48 and accompanying text. 
 26. For an overview of the charitable contribution deduction as it relates to churches 
and the political speech restrictions, see Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable 
Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C. L. REV. 843 (2001). 
 27. Id; see also I.R.C. § 508(c)(1)(a); TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at 3. Despite the 
automatic tax-exempt qualification of churches, the IRS suggests that churches seek formal 
recognition of their status as 501(c)(3) organizations for the purpose of “assur[ing] church 
leaders, members, and contributors that the church is recognized as exempt and qualifies for 
related tax benefits.” Id. The automatic qualification does not apply to “religious 
organizations,” as distinguished from “churches.” Religious organizations that do not meet 
the IRS criteria of a church must apply for and obtain recognition of their 501(c)(3) status to 
be exempt from taxation. Id. 
 28. TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at 3. 
 29. All other organizations seeking tax-exempt status as 501(c)(3) organizations, 
however, must apply for formal recognition under normal IRS procedures. See generally IRS, 
TAX-EXEMPT STATUS FOR YOUR ORGANIZATION (2005) [hereinafter TAX-EXEMPT STATUS], 
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p557.pdf (explaining the new procedures for 
filing a Form 1023 to obtain formal recognition as a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) organization). 
Despite this traditional rule, courts have asserted that the tax-exempt status of churches 
is not a constitutional right but rather a matter of legislative grace. See, e.g., Christian Echoes 
Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 857 (10th Cir. 1972) (“[T]ax exemption 
is a privilege, a matter of grace rather than right.”). 
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requirements,30 churches benefit from specific rules limiting the 
IRS’s authority and opportunity to audit churches,31 and churches 
are exempt from certain unemployment taxes.32 The unique tax 
treatment of churches33 as compared to other nonprofits is an 
acknowledgement by Congress of the special role of religion in the 
United States. As the IRS has observed, 
Congress has enacted special tax laws applicable to churches, 
religious organizations, and ministers in recognition of their unique 
status in American society and of their rights guaranteed by the 
First Amendment . . . . Churches and religious organizations are 
generally exempt from income tax and receive other favorable 
treatment under the tax law . . . .34
2. History of church tax-exempt status and the political speech restrictions 
The general history of churches’ tax-exempt status in the United 
States and the subsequent restrictions placed on tax-exempt entities 
provide a foundation for the modern debate over church political 
speech. Tax exemptions for churches under the federal tax system 
existed as early as 1798.35 In 1894, Congress passed the first income 
tax on corporations but exempted from the tax those “corporations, 
companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for 
charitable, religious or educational purposes.”36 Congress later 
 30. See TAX-EXEMPT STATUS, supra note 29, at 18 (explaining that churches are 
excepted from having to file a Form 990, the annual tax return for tax-exempt organizations). 
 31. See I.R.C. § 7611 (2000); see also TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at 22. 
 32. See I.R.C. § 3309(b)(1). 
 33. Beyond the special tax rules for churches listed here, this Comment also identifies 
other differences in the tax treatment of churches, which differences provide insight into how 
to apply the lobbying restrictions to churches. For example, the tax code includes certain 
communications between a tax-exempt organization and its members in the list of restricted 
lobbying activities. However, this provision does not apply to churches. See infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 34. TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at Introduction. 
 35. In 1798, Congress first recognized the validity of various state systems of exempting 
religious bodies from real estate taxes and other assessments. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 
U.S. 664, 677–78 & n.5 (1970) (discussing history of religious tax exemptions in the U.S. and 
recognizing the historic view of “the Religion Clauses of the Constitution as authorizing 
statutory real estate tax exemption to religious bodies”). 
 36. Wilson Tariff Act of 1894, Pub. L. No. 53-227, 28 Stat. 509, 556 (1894). The 
Supreme Court later declared this Act unconstitutional in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust 
Co., 157 U.S. 429, 586 (1895), modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). However, after the passage of 
the Sixteenth Amendment, the exemption again became valid after further legislation in 1913. 
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completed the second prong of tax-exempt status in 1917 by 
allowing a charitable tax deduction for contributions made to 
“corporations or associations organized and operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.”37 At that 
time, the only restriction against such organizations was that “no 
part of the net income” of such charitable organizations could 
“inure[] to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual.”38
However, in 1934, Congress for the first time passed legislation 
adding the restriction that “no substantial part of the activities” of a 
tax-exempt corporation or foundation (including churches) may 
consist of “carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to 
influence legislation.”39 The original version of the bill banned tax-
exempt organizations from any “participation in partisan politics.”40 
Later, this ambiguous phrase was removed in conference41 because, 
according to Representative Samuel B. Smith, “[w]e were afraid this 
provision was too broad.”42 Finally, in 1954, Senator Lyndon B. 
Johnson introduced the highly controversial campaigning 
restriction,43 which Congress amended in 1986 to include a 
restriction against opposing political candidates to supplement the 
existing ban on endorsing candidates.44
See Murphy, supra note 11, at 41–63 (describing in more detail the history of tax-exempt 
status for religious organizations). 
 37. War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917). For a more 
detailed history of the charitable contribution deduction, see Aprill, supra note 26, at 848–56. 
 38. War Revenue Act of 1917, § 1201(2). This restriction is still one of the conditions 
placed upon tax-exempt entities today. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 39. Revenue Act of 1934, § 101(6), Pub. L. No. 73-216 (1934). This amendment was 
introduced by Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania who wanted to protect the interest of 
donors who did not desire their money to be used to finance lobbying activities. See Deborah 
J. Zimmerman, Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti: First Amendment Considerations to Loss of 
Tax Exemption, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 249, 252 (2003). 
 40. S. REP. NO. 73-558, at 26 (1934). 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 73-1385, at 3–4 (1934) (Conf. Rep.). 
 42. 78 CONG. REC. 7,831 (1934) (statement of Representative Samuel B. Hill). 
 43. For a history of the amendment that added the political campaign restriction, see 
generally O’Daniel, supra, note 11 at 740–68 (describing the rationale behind the amendment 
and Johnson’s motivations for proposing it); see also Murphy, supra note 11, at 46–58 (same). 
 44. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085; see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 100-391, at 1621, 1625 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-1201, 
2313-1205 (explaining that the rationale for the change was to promote neutrality and prevent 
public funds from subsidizing political activities). 
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B. The Lobbying Restrictions 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Code mandates that “no substantial 
part of [a tax-exempt church’s] activities” may consist of “carrying 
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.”45 
Many of the problems created by this language stem from the 
difficulty of distinguishing sincere issue advocacy in areas of religious 
or moral concern from politically partisan and nonreligious lobbying 
efforts.46 Some would question not only whether the government 
has the ability to make this distinction but also whether making such 
a distinction is appropriate at all.47 These problems are compounded 
by the broad definition of “legislation” the IRS has adopted as well 
as by the vagueness of the terms “substantial” and “influence” in the 
tax code.48 Although tax regulations, IRS commentary, and judicial 
interpretation have provided some insight into the scope of the 
lobbying restrictions, a clear explanation of the relationship between 
these restrictions and the tax-exempt status of churches remains 
elusive.49 This Section examines and offers a clearer understanding of 
the meaning of 501(c)(3)’s restrictions against influencing legislation 
as they apply to tax-exempt churches. 
 45. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 46. As John Baker testified before Congress, “War and peace, human welfare, civil 
rights, abortion, and education are all public issues but they have attributes which make them 
also religious issues. The list of these areas of governmental involvement with society which 
some of the churches assert also demand religious involvement is almost infinite.” Legislative 
Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the H. Ways and Means 
Comm., 92d Cong. 283 (1972) (statement of John W. Baker, Acting Executive Director, 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs). 
 47. Michael J. Perry argues the following: 
Because of the role that religious arguments about the morality of human conduct 
inevitably play in the political process, it is important that such arguments, no less 
than secular or moral arguments, be presented in—so that they can be tested in—
public political debate. Moreover, it is impossible to construct ‘an airtight barrier’ 
between, on the one side, public culture generally—in which religiously based moral 
discourse is undeniably proper—and on the other, public debate specifically about 
controversial political issues. 
MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 61 
(1997). 
 48. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 49. See Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS 
Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REV. 875, 895 
(2001) (arguing that there is no “bright line between reasonable and unreasonable applications 
of the restrictions on tax-exempt organizations’ political activity”). 
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1. Establishing the constitutionality of the lobbying restrictions 
Before the Supreme Court’s allegedly conclusive decision 
regarding the lobbying restrictions in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation,50 courts had generally suggested that certain 
manifestations of religious belief in the political realm were entirely 
appropriate. For example, in Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner,51 the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals overturned the disallowance of a tax 
deduction for a bequest to the Board of Temperance, Prohibition, 
and Public Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church. Arguably, the 
purpose of this organization was largely political as well as religious 
because the Board’s goal was to promote private moral behavior.52
The Girard Trust court faced the difficult task of applying the 
lobbying restrictions added to the tax code in 1934.53 Questioning 
whether the lobbying restrictions required the complete separation 
of religious exercise and political participation, the court emphasized 
the strong relationship between religious belief and political activity: 
A bright line between that which brings conviction to one person 
and its influence on the body politic cannot be drawn. . . . Religion 
includes a way of life as well as beliefs upon the nature of the world 
and the admonitions to be “Doers of the word and not hearers 
only” (James 1:22) and “Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, 
. . .” (Matthew 28:19) are as old as the Christian Church. The step 
from acceptance by the believer to his seeking to influence others in 
the same direction is a perfectly natural one, and it is found in 
countless religious groups. The next step, equally natural, is to 
secure the sanction of organized society for or against certain 
outward practices thought to be essential.54
 50. 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (establishing the constitutionality of the lobbying restrictions 
and the IRS’s authority to enforce these restrictions). 
 51. 122 F.2d 108 (3d Cir. 1941). 
 52. The stated purpose of the organization was “to promote the cause of temperance by 
every legitimate means; to prevent the improper use of drugs and narcotics; to render aid to 
such causes as in the judgment of the board of trustees, tend to advance the public welfare.” 
Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 53. Id. at 108–09. The lobbying restriction at that time was identical to the language in 
the code today. See id.; I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000). 
 54. Girard Trust, 122 F.2d at 110 (second omission in original). Previous to this 
decision, some courts had denied deductions for contributions to organizations that claimed to 
have religious or educational purposes, but which the courts found to have had legislative 
agendas involving “controversial” subjects or “partisan” propaganda. See, e.g., Leubuscher v. 
Comm’r, 54 F.2d 998, 1000 (2d Cir. 1932) (denying deduction for bequest to an 
3ANDERSEN.FIN 4/8/2006 2:13 PM 
115] Political Silence at Church and the Lobbying Restrictions 
 127 
 
Applying this deferential standard allowing the church’s Board to 
define and carry out its own religious mission, the Girard Trust 
court allowed the deduction for the bequest.55 The court reasoned 
that the Methodist organization had a valid tax-exempt purpose and 
that the propaganda used to promote these goals constituted 
permissible religious activities not in violation of the lobbying 
restrictions.56
Later, the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Walz v. Tax 
Commission,57 which generally upheld the constitutionality of tax 
exemptions for religious organizations, recognized a principle similar 
to that articulated in Girard Trust: “Adherents of particular faiths 
and individual churches frequently take strong positions on public 
issues including . . . vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional 
positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and private 
citizens have that right.”58 While neither Girard Trust nor Walz 
questioned the constitutionality of the lobbying restrictions, both 
cases raised important concerns about attempting to separate 
appropriate religious activity from substantial political advocacy. 
The first major case directly addressing the constitutionality of 
the lobbying restrictions was Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. 
v. United States.59 This case involved the revocation of a religious 
corporation’s tax-exempt status for engaging in both extensive 
lobbying60 and political campaigning.61 Reversing the lower court’s 
organization whose purposes involved “the dissemination of controversial propaganda”); 
Noyes v. Comm’r, 31 B.T.A. 121, 124 (1934) (denying deduction for contribution to an 
organization whose national body had “supported a particular view upon subjects extremely 
controversial in their nature” and whose local body “was active in supporting and opposing 
bills in the state legislature which were controversial in nature”); Forstall v. Comm’r, 29 
B.T.A. 428, 436 (1933) (determining that the organization’s purpose was not educational 
because it promoted only one side of “a highly controversial question”); Appeal of Fales, 9 
B.T.A. 828, 832 (1927) (affirming tax commissioner’s disallowance of deduction for 
contribution to organizations “formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda”). 
However, these cases were decided before the addition of the lobbying restrictions in the tax 
code and mostly involved a traditional charitable trust analysis. Girard Trust is significant 
because it involved a direct analysis of the lobbying restrictions as they relate to deductions for 
donations to a religious organization. 
 55. Girard Trust, 122 F.2d at 111. 
 56. Id. at 110–11. 
 57. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
 58. Id. at 670. 
 59. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). 
 60. Although some of the lobbying efforts engaged in by the corporation involved 
religious issues (i.e., school prayer), id. at 854, the organization also actively supported and 
3ANDERSEN.FIN 4/8/2006 2:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
128 
 
holding that the denial of tax-exempt status violated the Free 
Exercise Clause,62 the Tenth Circuit held that the religious sincerity 
of the organization was irrelevant and that Congress had adopted the 
lobbying restrictions as a valid limitation on the organization’s rights 
of free speech and free exercise.63 Without citing any legislative 
history, however, the court also declared what it saw as the 
overriding congressional policies behind the political speech 
restrictions: political neutrality64 and the separation of church and 
state.65 The Christian Echoes decision was expansive because, for the 
first time, a court had upheld the revocation of a religious entity’s 
tax-exempt status for substantially engaging in both indirect and 
direct lobbying, as well as political campaigning. Nonetheless, the 
relative importance of and policies behind the two political speech 
restrictions remained unknown until the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to exclusively examine the lobbying restrictions. 
Not until 1983 did the Supreme Court specifically address the 
constitutionality of the lobbying restrictions and the IRS’s authority 
to enforce them. In Regan v. Taxation with Representation,66 the 
Court upheld the IRS’s denial of tax-exempt status to a newly 
organized nonprofit corporation solely because a substantial part of 
its intended activities would consist of attempts to influence 
campaigned for legislative action on dozens of issues that in the court’s view had nothing to do 
with religion—including the abolition of the income tax, U.S. withdrawal from the United 
Nations, and certain immigration laws, id. at 855. 
 61. Id. at 856 (discussing the corporation’s support of and opposition to several 
candidates for political office). 
 62. The Tenth Circuit determined “that the trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions 
of law in this area are clearly erroneous.” Id. at 857. The lower court had found that only one 
of the activities of the church could appropriately be classified as “lobbying.” Id. at 853. 
 63. Id. at 856–57. 
 64. Id. at 854 (“The limitations in Section 501(c)(3) stem from the Congressional 
policy that the United States Treasury should be neutral in political affairs and that substantial 
activities directed to attempts to influence legislation or affect a political campaign should not 
be subsidized.” (emphasis omitted)). Interestingly, this was the same language that Congress 
would later adopt as its formally stated policy behind the political speech restrictions. See H.R. 
REP. NO. 100-391, at 1621, 1625 (1987), as reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-
1201, 2313-1205. 
 65. Christian Echoes, 470 F.2d at 857 (“The free exercise clause of the First Amendment 
is restrained only to the extent of denying tax exempt status and then only in keeping with an 
overwhelming and compelling Governmental interest: That of guarantying that the wall 
separating church and state remain high and firm.”). 
 66. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). 
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legislation.67 Focusing on tax-exempt status as a “form of subsidy,”68 
the Court held tightly to two important principles: (1) the First 
Amendment does not require the government to subsidize 
lobbying69 and (2) “a legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right.”70 Based 
on this subsidy framework, the Court concluded that the lobbying 
restrictions neither created an unconstitutional burden of free speech 
rights under the First Amendment71 nor violated equal protection 
under the Fifth Amendment.72 Ultimately, the Court reasoned that 
“Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as extensively as it chose 
to subsidize other activities that nonprofit organizations undertake 
to promote the public welfare.”73  
Although Regan provides some insight into the Supreme Court’s 
use of the subsidy model to analyze the lobbying restrictions, the 
decision is not entirely conclusive as to religious entities because the 
nonprofit corporation in Regan was not a church and had no 
religious purpose. Therefore, the Supreme Court has yet to decide 
the meaning of the lobbying restriction as applied to churches and 
their free-exercise rights. Nonetheless, the question of when and 
how a church’s lobbying activities constitute substantial attempts to 
influence legislation has been left largely to the IRS as the regulatory 
body with authority to provide such answers. 
 67. Id. at 550–51. The organization’s stated position was that it would “advocate its 
point of view before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary.” Id. at 542. 
 68. Id. at 544. The Court described the similarity between a governmental cash subsidy 
and the two conditions of tax-exempt status—exemption from paying taxes and deductibility 
of contributions: “A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the 
organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income. Deductible 
contributions are similar to cash grants of the amount of a portion of the individual’s 
contributions.” Id. However, the Court did note that by using this comparison, it “of course 
[did] not mean to assert that they are in all respects identical.” Id. at 544 n.5. 
 69. Id. at 546 (citing Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959) (holding 
that the denial of a business-expense deduction for lobbying is constitutional but that 
attempting to deny all deductions for business expenses to a taxpayer would unconstitutionally 
burden First Amendment rights)). 
 70. Id. at 549. 
 71. Id. at 545–46. 
 72. Id. at 546–51. 
 73. Id. at 544 (emphasis added). Interestingly, even under this subsidy model, the 
Court implicitly recognized the validity of some subsidization of lobbying activities by tax-
exempt organizations. 
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2. Broad meaning of “influence legislation” 
Under its statutory authority to “prescribe all needful rules and 
regulations,”74 the IRS has attempted to promulgate regulations that 
adequately define the scope of the lobbying restrictions.75 These 
regulations attribute the label of “action organization”76 to any 
501(c)(3) entity that fails to qualify as a tax-exempt entity because it 
engages in substantial attempts to influence legislation.77 Although 
these regulations offer some examples of church activities that 
constitute attempts to “influence legislation,” the regulations do not 
adequately define the relevant scope of church activities that are 
appropriate. Thus, churches are, for the most part, left in the dark as 
to what types of and how much direct or indirect lobbying they can 
engage in without risking the loss of their tax-exempt status. 
a. Defining “legislation.” The first problematic issue created by 
the regulations is the extremely broad definition of the term 
“legislation.” The regulations state that “legislation . . . includes 
action by the Congress, by any State legislature, by any local council 
or similar governing body, or by the public in a referendum, 
initiative, constitutional amendment, or similar procedure.”78 This 
definition encompasses any “action” of virtually every legislative 
body at all levels of government, effectively covering everything from 
congressional hearings to city council meetings. The definition’s 
inclusion of the lawmaking capacity of the people themselves (i.e., 
referenda and ballot initiatives) is indicative of the potential severity 
of the lobbying restrictions because it possibly implicates a church’s 
influence on not only the general populace but also individual 
church members and congregations. Further, the listed examples of 
legislation cannot be all-inclusive because the definition merely states 
that legislation “includes” these items while leaving open the 
possibility that other “similar procedure[s]” may constitute 
legislation. Perhaps more notable is the lack of an exception for 
those legislative processes that directly affect the rights of a church or 
 74. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2000). 
 75. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii), (iv) (as amended in 1990). 
 76. An “action organization” is not tax-exempt because it is “not operated exclusively 
for one or more exempt purposes.” Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(i). 
 77. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii). 
 78. Id. 
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group of churches79—including laws affecting the free exercise of 
religion, the legal recognition of religious entities, or even the 
taxation of churches. Under this definition, churches hesitant to test 
the murky waters of § 501(c)(3)’s vague standard for determining 
how much lobbying is too much lobbying80 are left only with the 
remedies available through executive or judicial branches.81
b. The scope of “influencing legislation.” The core of the tax-
exempt lobbying regulations promulgated by the IRS provides that 
“[a]n organization is an action organization [and therefore not tax-
exempt] if a substantial part of its activities is attempting to influence 
legislation by propaganda or otherwise.”82 While the regulations do 
 79. The definition of “influencing legislation” found in § 4911 of the Internal Revenue 
Code does make an exception for “appearances before, or communications to, any legislative 
body with respect to a possible decision of such body which might affect the existence of the 
organization, its powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or the deduction of contributions to the 
organization.” I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(C). However, this section does not apply to churches. See 
I.R.C. § 501(h)(7); see also infra Part II.B.2.c. 
 80. The IRS subjectively applies the vague statutory test of § 501(c)(3) to determine the 
point at which a church’s lobbying activities constitute a “substantial part” of its overall 
activities. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). If the activities constitute only an insubstantial portion of the 
overall activities, the church is in no danger of losing its tax-exempt status. This Comment 
refers to this test simply as the “insubstantiality test.” See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 81. Bruce Hopkins points out that the restrictions do not prohibit 501(c)(3) 
organizations from lobbying the executive branch: “[T]hese rules do not apply to attempts to 
influence the executive branch or independent regulatory agencies of a government. Thus, this 
body of law is generally inapplicable to attempts to influence the development of regulations, 
rules, form instructions, and the like.” BRUCE R. HOPKINS, PLANNING GUIDE FOR THE LAW 
OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 108 (2004). He also points out that “the rules generally do 
not apply to attempts to influence the judicial branch of a government. This type of advocacy 
usually constitutes the preparation and filing of amicus curiae briefs or other participation in 
litigation.” Id. 
 82. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added). Some 
have interpreted the scope of “influencing legislation” to include an element of both specificity 
and subjectivity: 
  If a policy-related, political communication displays both specificity and 
subjectivity, it will be held to be an attempt to influence legislation. Specificity refers 
to the relationship between the communication and a concrete policy objective. The 
IRS does not equate efforts to alter general societal attitudes with efforts to 
influence legislation. Instead, an organization violates the specificity test only if its 
political message encourages specific legislative action or calls for a policy change 
that could occur only through legislative action. . . . 
  In contrast, the subjectivity test focuses on the methods of persuasion rather 
than the message itself. The test represents an attempt to identify communications 
that employ argument rather than fact in advocating particular positions. It treats 
factual analysis and logical reasoning as less egregious methods of influencing 
legislation than appeals to emotion and normative judgments. 
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not provide the scope or limitations of what constitutes propaganda 
or attempts to influence legislation, they do provide two general 
examples of these lobbying activities. The regulations characterize a 
tax-exempt entity as having attempted to influence legislation if it 
“(a) [c]ontacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a 
legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or 
opposing legislation; or (b) [a]dvocates the adoption or rejection of 
legislation.”83 The IRS has provided some additional guidance on 
the meaning of these examples. For example, the IRS does not 
automatically deem all church involvement in issues of public policy 
to be lobbying.84 Further, the IRS takes the position that church 
leaders are not “prohibited from speaking about important issues of 
public policy,”85 and churches may “otherwise consider public policy 
issues in an educational manner without jeopardizing their tax-
exempt status.”86
Despite these somewhat helpful hints, the answers to several 
important questions remain unclear, including (1) what church 
activities or statements constitute “advocacy” as opposed to 
“educational” communications, (2) whether church members are 
included as part of “the public,” and (3) where to draw the line 
between speaking out on important issues of public policy and 
advocating or opposing legislation.87 Without clear answers to these 
Developments in the Law—Political Activity of Nonprofit Corporations, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1656, 1661 (1992). While elements of specificity and subjectivity might have a role in 
determining whether a given activity constitutes an attempt to influence legislation, the IRS 
has not formally adopted such an interpretation of the lobbying restrictions. 
 83. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a)–(b) (emphasis added). The IRS’s Tax 
Guide for Churches and Religious Organizations also includes contacting employees of a 
legislative body as a restricted activity. TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at 6 (“A church or religious 
organization will be regarded as attempting to influence legislation if it contacts, or urges the 
public to contact, members or employees of a legislative body for the purpose of proposing, 
supporting, or opposing legislation, or if the organization advocates the adoption or rejection 
of legislation.” (second emphasis added)). Another IRS publication similarly broadens the field 
to include “any member or employee of a legislative body . . . who may participate in the 
formulation of legislation.” TAX-EXEMPT STATUS, supra note 29, at 45. 
 84. TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at 6. 
 85. Id. at 7. 
 86. Id. at 6. “For example, churches may conduct educational meetings [or] prepare 
and distribute educational materials.” Id. The IRS does not define what “educational” means 
in this context.  
 87. Courts have used conflicting language when attempting to make these distinctions. 
For example, the D.C. Circuit held that a § 501(c)(3) organization could retain its tax-exempt 
status if it “studies an issue touching on legislation, reaches a conclusion with respect to that 
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questions, churches are wary of possible attempts to enforce strict 
interpretations of the lobbying restrictions and therefore do not 
engage in influencing or participating in crucial public policy debates 
to the extent that they would otherwise. Therefore, the ambiguity of 
these regulations has the effect of discouraging at least some 
churches from expressing opinions on modern policy issues or 
engaging in activities that promote their religious beliefs that the IRS 
may classify as lobbying. 
c. Why other definitions of “influencing legislation” do not and 
should not apply. Other examples of attempts to influence legislation 
appear in the tax code, but these examples do not apply to churches. 
Section 501(h) of the tax code provides a lobbying expenditure test 
that allows certain tax-exempt organizations to definitively ascertain 
whether they are in compliance with the lobbying restrictions.88 For 
those organizations choosing to make this expenditure test election, 
§ 501(h) replaces the vague insubstantiality test of § 501(c)(3)89 
with the precise amount of lobbying spending in which these entities 
may engage without losing tax-exempt status and paying certain tax 
penalties.90
Because the § 501(h) standard is much more concrete, more 
specific definitions of what constitute attempts to influence 
legislation are necessary to make the expenditure calculations. These 
special definitions are found in § 4911.91 In providing specific 
examples of activities that constitute attempts to influence 
legislation, § 4911 includes communications between a tax-exempt 
entity and its members that either encourage members to engage in 
their own political lobbying efforts or urge members to encourage 
issue, and then argues the merits of that conclusion.” Fund for the Study of Econ. Growth and 
Tax Reform v. IRS, 161 F.3d 755, 760 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1998). In the same breath, the court 
held that a § 501(c)(3) organization could not retain its tax-exempt status if it “assumes a 
conclusion with respect to a highly public and controversial legislative issue and then goes into 
the business of selling that conclusion.” Id. Unfortunately, the court does not explain why 
arguing the merits of a conclusion does not constitute advocacy while attempting to sell that 
conclusion does constitute advocacy. Further, it should make no difference that the issue is 
“highly public and controversial,” id., because the tax code does not distinguish between 
contentious and noncontentious issues. 
 88. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2000). 
 89. For a discussion of the insubstantiality test, see infra Part II.B.3. 
 90. I.R.C. § 501(h); see also TAX-EXEMPT STATUS, supra note 29, at 45–46 (providing 
the detailed rules regarding the lobbying expenditure test). 
 91. I.R.C. § 4911(d). 
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nonmembers to do so.92 This restriction against grassroots 
lobbying,93 however, does not apply to churches because the Internal 
Revenue Code establishes that churches cannot make the § 501(h) 
election94 and the definitions and examples of §§ 501(h) and 4911 
do not apply to churches or any other tax-exempt entity that does 
not make the expenditure test election.95  
 92. Id. § 4911(d)(3)(A)–(B). 
 93. These limitations on membership communications are part of the Code’s restriction 
against “grass roots lobbying communication,” which includes “any attempt to influence any 
legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment 
thereof.” Treas. Reg. § 56.4911-2(b)(2)(i) (1990). To constitute “grassroots lobbying,” a 
communication must (1) refer to specific legislation, (2) express a view on such legislation, and 
(3) encourage the recipients of the communication to take action regarding the legislation. Id. 
§ 56.4911-2(b)(2)(ii). As this Section explains, however, these grassroots lobbying restrictions 
(with their accompanying limitations on internal membership communication) fortunately do 
not apply to churches. I.R.C. § 501(h)(5). The fact that Congress specifically excluded 
churches from the restrictions against grassroots lobbying is recognition of the role that 
religion itself plays in shaping the opinions of the general public. To mandate that churches 
not engage in attempts to influence the public would substantially impair the religious mission 
of several churches who wish to spread their message. Whether that religious message 
somehow relates to or even affects the outcome of controversial public policy debates should 
have no bearing on a church’s tax-exempt status. As Dean Kelley argues, 
Churches are bound by their sense of mission, their consecrated obedience to God, 
to speak out on issues where the well-being of persons is at stake, to proclaim what 
they believe is the right and moral course for the whole society and what will benefit 
everyone, not just themselves or their members. Churches were doing this sort of 
thing before there were legislatures or lobbies, and they will continue to do so—
despite whatever odds or obstacles—as long as there are churches. 
KELLEY, supra note 7, at 86. 
 94. I.R.C. § 501(h)(5)(A) (describing churches as “disqualified organizations” and 
citing id. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i)); id. § 501(h)(7). 
 95. “[N]othing in [section 501(h)] or in section 4911 shall be construed to affect the 
interpretation of the phrase, ‘no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on 
propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation,’ under [section 501(c)(3)].” Id. § 
501(h)(7). Application of some of the language in § 4911 to churches could be helpful to those 
seeking to stay within the boundaries of the lobbying restrictions. For example, § 4911 makes an 
exception for appearances before or communications with legislative bodies making decisions 
directly affecting the rights and authorities of the organization. See id. § 4911(d)(2)(C); Treas. 
Reg. § 56.4911-2(c)(4). However, application of § 4911 to churches would have a detrimental 
effect on the communicative relationship between a church and its members that would far 
outweigh the law’s benefits. As the IRS explains, § 4911 excludes “communications between an 
organization and its bona fide members about legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest 
to the organization and the members, unless these communications directly encourage the 
members to attempt to influence legislation or directly encourage members to urge nonmembers 
to attempt to influence legislation.” TAX-EXEMPT STATUS, supra note 29, at 45. Although 
application of this exception to churches would allow them to influence legislation directly 
affecting their rights, the disallowance of open and free communication within an organization 
would be much more harmful to the religious rights of churches. 
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If this restriction against internal grassroots lobbying applied to 
churches, it would significantly restrict the ability of churches to 
communicate with their members regarding important public policy 
issues. Not allowing churches and religious leaders to urge church 
members to take action on certain issues would render the ability to 
discuss such issues in a religious setting the equivalent of an empty 
right. In essence, churches could tell members that a public policy 
issue is important and even take a strong position on that issue, but 
they could not invite members to act on their religious convictions 
to support or oppose laws in accordance with that position. 
This restriction, however, does not apply to churches. Instead, 
Congress made a conscious decision not only to exclude churches 
from being able to make the § 501(h) election but also to make § 
4911’s definition of “attempting to influence legislation” 
inapplicable to churches.96 By so doing, Congress recognized the 
special relationship that churches have with their members, as well as 
the problem of government interference with that relationship. In 
enforcing the lobbying restrictions against churches, the IRS does 
not even have the option of applying the § 4911 restriction against 
internal grassroots lobbying because § 4911’s definition of attempts 
to influence legislation does not apply to tax-exempt organizations 
still bound by the insubstantiality test of § 501(c)(3).97 Therefore, 
internal communications between churches and their members do 
not and should not have any effect on whether a church is engaging 
in substantial lobbying activities under the tax code. 
The question, however, is whether the IRS may independently 
deem such internal communications between churches and their 
members as being within the scope of the lobbying restrictions. Such 
a possibility is troubling and highlights the need for Congress or the 
IRS to voluntarily clarify any remaining uncertainty in this area. 
Ultimately, the definition of legislation is so broad, and the 
regulations regarding church lobbying activities so vague, that 
churches seeking to influence public policy in any respect will likely 
have to rely on the protections of the insubstantiality test. 
 96. See I.R.C. § 501(h)(7). 
 97. See supra note 95. 
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3. The “insubstantiality” test 
The greatest source of confusion in applying the lobbying 
restrictions to churches is the insubstantiality test of § 501(c)(3).98 
The loss or denial of a church’s tax-exempt status may occur when 
(1) the church’s articles of incorporation authorize the organization 
to have a substantial part of its activities consist of attempts to 
influence legislation,99 or (2) the IRS makes an independent 
determination that the church has done so in the past.100 As 
mentioned above,101 churches are not able to elect the lobbying 
expenditure test of § 501(h) and therefore must grapple with 
determining what constitutes a substantial part of their activities that 
attempt to influence legislation.102 This Section examines both IRS 
and court interpretations of this test. 
a. The IRS’s insubstantiality test. The IRS has offered little 
interpretation of the insubstantiality test, stating simply that churches 
“may engage in some lobbying, but too much lobbying activity risks 
loss of tax-exempt status.”103 Still, the IRS has revealed certain 
factors that it will take into account when applying this test: 
Whether a church’s or religious organization’s attempts to 
influence legislation constitute a substantial part of its overall 
activities is determined on the basis of all the pertinent facts and 
circumstances in each case. The IRS considers a variety of factors, 
including the time devoted (by both compensated and volunteer 
workers) and the expenditures devoted by the organization to the 
activity, when determining whether the lobbying activity is 
substantial.104
Despite this minimal guidance, the IRS’s standard in applying the 
insubstantiality test appears open to interpretation as churches 
struggle to determine at what point their lobbying activities 
endanger their tax-exempt status. In the end, the IRS has concluded 
 98. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (prohibiting churches from engaging in lobbying by demanding 
that such efforts constitute “no substantial part of the [church’s] activities”). 
 99. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(i). This is known as the “organizational test.” 
 100. See id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii). This is known as the “operational test.” 
 101. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 102. See I.R.C. § 501(h)(5)(A). 
 103. TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at 5. 
 104. Id. at 6. 
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that “there is no simple rule as to what amount of activities is 
substantial.”105
Several possible interpretations of the IRS standard demonstrate 
the problems associated with interpreting the lobbying restrictions. 
One explanation of the IRS’s insubstantiality test is that it is simply a 
quantitative calculation: adding up the amount of the church’s time 
and resources spent on influencing legislation and comparing that 
figure with the total time and resources spent on all activities of the 
church. Using this method, however, the IRS would still have to 
subjectively determine at what point this figure becomes 
“substantial.” Further, because neither the IRS nor the courts have 
determined within which organizational level or geographic area the 
insubstantiality test applies, the assumption is that substantiality is 
determined by examining the activities and spending of the entire 
organization in every geographic area in which it exists. 
Another interpretation of the test might focus more on 
qualitative factors, thus overlapping the substantive test of what 
activities constitute attempts to influence legislation with a subjective 
determination of whether those activities are “substantial.” In 
performing such a qualitative analysis, however, the IRS likely would 
have to examine the actual importance, effect, or even results of the 
church’s lobbying activities, as well as the issues at which the efforts 
are directed. Such an interpretation would allow the IRS to make 
arbitrary—and possibly politically motivated—decisions as to which 
issues were important enough to merit “protection” from religion 
and how much of an effect churches can actually have on the 
legislative process. This standard could also be troublesome because 
it might tend to punish those churches that are more successful in 
advocating their position while leaving unscathed those churches 
that are not as effective at lobbying. Further, this interpretation of 
the test seems to contradict the statutory language—which questions 
not whether the activities themselves are substantial but whether the 
activities constitute a substantial part of a church’s overall 
activities.106
One final approach the IRS might take—and likely the most 
difficult—is to attempt to distinguish between a church’s central 
religious mission and its ancillary political message by examining 
 105. Internal Revenue Manual, pt. 7, ch. 7.25.3.17.1.2(1) (Feb. 2, 1999). 
 106. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
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“the relative place of the organization’s lobbying activities in its 
larger agenda.”107 However, by using a church’s own beliefs and 
doctrines as a benchmark for whether its attempts to influence 
legislation are substantial, the IRS engages in the risky business of 
drawing concrete lines between the religious and the political where 
such lines do not always exist. In any case, while it is unclear what 
criteria the IRS may utilize in applying “all of the pertinent facts and 
circumstances” outside of the qualitative measures that the IRS 
currently provides, the potential for arbitrary decision-making creates 
opportunity for abuse. Fortunately, the IRS has not substantially 
abused its discretion in this area.108
b. Court interpretations of the insubstantiality test. Several judicial 
opinions have offered independent interpretations of the test, 
although few have done so in the context of religious organizations. 
Many courts have utilized the percentage test to make a quantitative 
determination of whether an organization’s lobbying activities are 
substantial. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Seasongood v. 
Commissioner established a substantiality threshold of five percent.109 
The court held that because less than five percent of the tax-exempt 
entity’s “time and effort” went to lobbying activities, the activities 
“were not in relation to all of its other activities substantial.”110 In 
calculating the total time and effort expended on lobbying activities, 
some courts have also looked to the organization’s time spent not 
only in conveying a political message to legislative bodies or the 
public but also in formulating and preparing that message.111 
Another group of opinions simply focus on total lobbying 
expenditures rather than time and effort. For example, the United 
States Tax Court in World Family Corp. v. Commissioner seemed to 
raise the five-percent standard when it reversed the IRS’s denial of 
 107. Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the Internal Revenue 
Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1280 (1993). This assumes, 
of course, that the church’s primary mission is not to engage in the promotion or rejection of 
legislation, which the IRS automatically considers not to be a tax-exempt purpose. 
 108. See Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not Sowed: Have American 
Churches Failed To Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 
29, 47 (2004) (arguing that “the Service and the courts have not stringently enforced the 
[political speech] limitations”). 
 109. 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955). 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., League of Women Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960). 
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tax-exempt status to a nonprofit corporation whose primary purpose 
was to provide interest-free loans to the missionaries of a church.112 
Although other nonreligious activities of the nonprofit corporation 
constituted approximately ten percent of the total expenditures, the 
court nonetheless held that these activities were “insubstantial and as 
such not an obstruction to tax exempt status under section 
501(c)(3).”113
Other courts have moved away from an exclusively quantitative 
analysis toward a more qualitative approach. The Tenth Circuit in 
Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States seemed to 
reject explicitly the percentage test in favor of a broader analysis: 
The political activities of an organization must be balanced in the 
context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization to 
determine whether a substantial part of its activities was to 
influence or attempt to influence legislation. A percentage test to 
determine whether the activities were substantial obscures the 
complexity of balancing the organization’s activities in relation to 
its objectives and circumstances.114
Some courts have attempted to perform this balancing test while 
still utilizing the percentage test as a part of their determination of 
whether an entity’s lobbying activities are substantial. For example, 
the court in Haswell v. United States upheld the IRS’s denial of a 
deduction for a taxpayer’s donation to an association organized “to 
preserve, improve, and expand railroad passenger service.”115 
Although the opinion quoted approvingly of Christian Echoes in 
declaring that “[a] percentage test to determine whether the 
activities are substantial is not appropriate,”116 the court’s analysis 
later shifted to actually include a percentage comparison of the 
charitable organization’s activities. Prefacing this adjusted reasoning, 
the court commented that “[a]lthough a percentage test is not 
determinative of substantiality,” the “allocat[ion of] expenditures 
among the various classes of functions is crucial to the ultimate 
 112. 81 T.C. 958, 959–60 (1983). 
 113. Id. at 967–68. 
 114. 470 F.2d 849, 855 (10th Cir. 1972) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 864 
(1973). For a discussion of the facts and reasoning behind the Tenth Circuit’s decision, see supra 
notes 59–65 and accompanying text. 
 115. 500 F.2d 1133, 1136 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975). 
 116. Id. at 1142. 
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determination.”117 The court then proceeded to calculate that the 
organization’s lobbying activities comprised between 16.6% and 
20.5% of its total expenditures for the years in question.118  
Ultimately, the Haswell decision upheld the disallowance of the 
taxpayer’s deduction by combining a percentage analysis with an 
assessment of whether the organization’s legislative program was a 
primary objective in its overall operations.119 The Haswell decision 
underscores the practical reality of insubstantiality test jurisprudence: 
although courts nominally may claim to engage in a multifactored 
balancing test, the crux of the analysis boils down to the time and 
money spent by an organization on lobbying activities.  
Thus, case law has failed to delineate any clearer standard beyond 
what Congress and the IRS have already provided. Nonetheless, two 
conclusions are apparent from the current interpretations of the 
lobbying restrictions. First, a church that spends only a minimal 
percentage of its time, funds, and activities to influence legislation is 
not in any real danger of losing its tax-exempt status. Second, a 
church’s attempts to influence legislation that are only ancillary to or 
a small part of the central religious mission of the church also pose 
no threat to the church maintaining its 501(c)(3) status. 
III. FRAMING THE ISSUE: POLICIES UNDERLYING THE LOBBYING 
RESTRICTIONS AND THE NEED FOR A NARROW INTERPRETATION 
With this legal understanding of the problems associated with 
interpreting the statutes, regulations, and case law that embody the 
lobbying restrictions, the analysis now turns to an examination of the 
competing policies underlying the tax-exempt status of churches in 
relation to these restrictions. The purpose of this Part is to identify 
the common threads of misunderstanding in applying the lobbying 
restrictions and to suggest possible clarifications that will protect the 
religious rights of churches to (1) freely communicate with their 
members about important policy issues and (2) encourage members 
to act on religious beliefs in shaping public policy. 
 117. Id. at 1146. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 1146–47. 
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A. Establishing an Analytical Framework 
Although modern commentators, courts, the IRS, and even 
Congress have weighed in on the policies underlying the lobbying 
restrictions, no consensus has been reached in establishing a proper 
framework for applying the lobbying restrictions to churches. 
Groups on both sides of the debate continue to frame the issue in 
policy terms favorable to their interpretation. 
Those who support unrestricted political speech of churches view 
any restriction against a church’s political advocacy as diametrically 
opposed to both church autonomy120 and each of the rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.121 These “religious free-speech 
advocates”122 assert that the political involvement of churches should 
have no bearing on tax-exempt status because the policies underlying 
favorable tax treatment of churches have nothing to do with whether 
churches engage in political speech. Specifically, by claiming that 
churches are not part of the tax base, this group refutes the notion 
that churches are simply another participant in a group of secular 
charitable organizations.123 They maintain that establishing 
restrictions on the political speech of churches in exchange for tax-
exempt status is the equivalent of “buying the churches’ silence” on 
political issues.124
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who claim that the 
real threat lies in allowing tax-exempt religious organizations to 
engage in partisan politics on the public dole. These “separationists” 
endorse the automatic removal of tax-exempt status for churches 
 120. See infra Part III.A.6 (summarizing the autonomy arguments for unrestricted 
political speech by churches). For an overview of the numerous issues associated with the 
principle of church autonomy, see Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 1217, 1259–86. 
 121. U.S. CONST. amend. I (guaranteeing that Congress will not make laws prohibiting 
the free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, the right of peaceable 
assembly, and the right to petition the government). 
 122. This analysis will utilize the term “religious free-speech advocates” to generally 
identify the position of those that oppose political speech restrictions against churches. 
 123. See infra notes 136–140 and accompanying text. 
 124. Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 
42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 778 (2001); see also Lee, supra note 4, at 434 (arguing that the tax code 
“pays churches through tax-exempt status to be silent on issues deemed by the state to be 
political”). 
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engaging in any type of political activity.125 Those who defend this 
separationist position contend that the realm of tax-exempt religious 
activity and ecclesiastical speech must remain completely detached 
from the political realm—including not only political campaigning 
but also the creation and implementation of public policy. Without 
strict enforcement of the current restrictions against churches’ 
political speech, separationists argue, religious entities would have an 
unchecked ability to promote their partisan agenda as publicly 
subsidized “political machines.”126
This Section examines the arguments of the separationist and 
religious free speech positions through the rubric of six current 
models for scrutinizing the lobbying restrictions as a condition of 
churches’ tax-exempt status. These models include subsidization, 
tax-base definition, accommodation, entanglement, neutrality, and 
autonomy.127 Although each school of thought attempts to frame the 
issue in terms of one model or another, this Section demonstrates 
that both sides in the debate can make valid arguments under each 
model. Ultimately, however, this Comment argues that each of these 
models provides further support for allowing religious entities to 
voice their opinions on moral issues and to encourage their members 
to act on their beliefs in shaping public policy. 
 125. Although the term “separationist” encompasses a broad variety of views regarding 
the separation of church and state, this term will be used throughout this analysis merely to 
describe the general position of those who favor restrictions against church participation in the 
political arena, particularly in the development of public policy. 
 126. See, e.g., AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, 
RELIGION, PARTISAN POLITICS AND TAX EXEMPTION: WHAT FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES—AND 
WHY 2 (arguing that “[m]ixing religion and partisan politics could lead to religious 
majoritarianism and divisiveness” and result in churches “form[ing] a political machine”) 
available at http://www.au.org/site/DocServer/Religion_Partisan_Politics_And_Tax 
_Exemption.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2006). 
 127. This Comment does not suggest that these six are the only models by which to 
examine the lobbying restrictions, nor does it argue that any one model is exclusive as all of the 
models are meant to overlap, complement, and compete with each other to inform the 
analysis. For example, although the analysis explores entanglement theory, the other two 
prongs of the Supreme Court’s infamous Lemon test are noticeably missing—namely, a secular 
purpose test and a primary effect analysis. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 
(1971). The analysis could also be informed by Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test or Justice 
Kennedy’s coercion test. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) (outlining the 
endorsement test); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 588–90 (1992) (discussing the coercion 
test). Nonetheless, the six models identified herein are the most common for examining issues 
related to tax-exempt status.  
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1. The subsidization model 
This first model portrays the tax-exempt status of churches as a 
type of government subsidy.128 The subsidization theory, described 
by some as “the most widely-accepted theory” in support of the tax-
exempt status of churches,129 at least has gained widespread 
recognition in the courts.130 Under this model, tax exemption is 
possible because the government enters a quid-pro-quo 
relationship131 with tax-exempt entities by offering a financial benefit 
“to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a 
useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public 
institutions of the same kind.”132
Separationists argue that these “public purposes” include only 
charitable services that the government would need to provide if tax-
exempt entities did not do so—such as care for the poor, emergency 
relief, or youth assistance programs.133 This position contends that to 
subsidize church activity beyond this charitable purpose and allow 
tax-exempt churches the opportunity to influence legislation would 
be to create a publicly funded political machine controlled by 
religion,134 which would constitute an unconstitutional establishment 
of religion.135
 128. Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” for Religious Institutions Constitutionally 
Dependent on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 805, 809 (2001) (articulating in 
more detail the theory behind the subsidization model). 
 129. Murphy, supra note 11, at 64. Some have criticized the subsidization model as not 
providing a proper framework for examining tax-exempt status: “While [the term] ‘subsidy’ is 
accurate terminology from the standpoint of the pure economics of the matter, it misconstrues 
and distorts the larger (and far more important) political philosophical rationalization for tax 
exemption for nonprofit organizations.” BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT 
ORGANIZATIONS 20 (8th ed. 2003). 
 130. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983); Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545, 546 (1983); Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. 
United States, 470 F.2d 849, 854, 857 (10th Cir. 1972). 
 131. See, e.g., Episcopal Camp Found., Inc. v. Hope, 666 A.2d 108, 110 (Me. 1995) 
(quoting YMCA v. City of Phila., 187 A. 204, 210 (Pa. 1936) (describing the relationship as 
“quid pro quo”)). 
 132. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 588 (emphasis added). 
 133. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 11, at 63 (“A tax-exempt entity is given special tax 
treatment because it performs services for the community that, in the absence of that entity, 
the government would need to provide.”). 
 134. See supra note 126. 
 135. Professor Zelinsky has demonstrated that the modern doctrine adopted by the 
Supreme Court “is that exemptions, exclusions, and deductions limited to religious actors and 
activities constitute unconstitutional subsidies in violation of the Establishment Clause.” 
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On the other hand, religious free-speech advocates argue that 
government gives a tax benefit (subsidy) to churches not merely 
because of charitable services that churches offer but, more 
importantly, because of the critical and protected role that religion 
plays in society.136 The Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Commission 
recognized that churches, as well as other tax-exempt organizations, 
provide “beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life.”137 
Nonetheless, the Court distinguished churches from all other 
charitable organizations by recognizing that religious organizations 
“exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large” and 
advance the “moral or mental improvement” of society.138 
Accordingly, the Court determined that it was “unnecessary to 
justify the tax exemption on the social welfare services or ‘good 
works’ that some churches perform for parishioners and others.”139 
Thus, there is at least some support for the argument that because 
churches have a stabilizing influence on society and provide moral 
Zelinsky, supra note 128, at 834–35; cf. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989) 
(“[W]hen government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not 
required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or 
cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise 
of religion, . . . it ‘provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations’ and 
cannot but ‘conve[y] a message of endorsement’ to slighted members of the community.” 
(quoting Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. 
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). 
 136. Deirdre Dessingue describes the critical role that churches play in positively shaping 
the moral and civic behavior of the nation’s citizens: 
  In their involvement with public life, churches offer unique contributions. 
They speak with prophetic witness, address moral dimensions of civic life, and 
maintain a voice set in opposition to political interests and secular cultural 
influences. This is what faith demands and society deserves. “The exclusion of the 
moral factor from the policy debate is purchased at a high price not only for our 
values but also in terms of our interests. . . . To ignore the moral dimensions of 
public policy is to forsake our constitutional heritage.” 
Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax Code Prohibits; Why; To 
What End?, 42 B.C. L. REV. 903, 923 (2001) (quoting Joseph Cardinal Bernardin, Archbishop 
of Chicago, Role of the Religious Leader in the Development of Public Policy, Address at the ABA 
Annual Convention, Chi., Ill., (Aug. 4, 1984) (omission in original)); see also Ablin, supra note 
11, at 573–75. 
 137. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). Interestingly, Justice Brennan 
argued that “[t]ax exemptions and general subsidies . . . are qualitatively different.” Id. at 690 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
 138. Id. at 672 (majority opinion). 
 139. Id. at 674. In Texas Monthly, the Court attempted to clarify that this statement does 
not mean tax benefits may be given only to religious organizations to the exclusion of other 
tax-exempt entities. 489 U.S. at 12 n.2. 
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value beyond the mere provision of charitable services, restricting 
their capacity to shape public policy would stifle, if not eliminate, 
their ability to have such a positive influence.140
2. The tax-base definition model 
Another model, which somewhat contradicts the subsidization 
model, is the tax-base definition model. Under this theory, churches 
are not “exempt” from taxation because they are simply not part of 
the tax base by default.141 This theory is founded on the principle 
that churches “cannot be exceptions from a rule in which they were 
never included.”142 According to this model, the label of “tax-
exempt” status is misleading because deductions, exclusions, and 
exemptions for churches merely define the relevant tax base, of 
which churches are not a part.143 Advocates of church political speech 
argue that threatening to tax churches if they engage in too many 
attempts to influence legislation goes against American history and 
tradition for two reasons: (1) historically, the government generally 
has never included churches in the tax base,144 and (2) the most 
 140. Professor Galston argues that relaxing the political speech restrictions against 
churches would have a positive societal influence: 
  Permitting houses of worship to engage in greater amounts of advocacy might, 
then, increase the opportunities for congregations to influence legislation or 
campaigns, intensify pressure on officials and parties to adopt policies and enact 
legislation targeted to improve the conditions of marginalized or other needy 
populations, and expand on the types of civic skills that lead to an enhanced sense of 
political efficacy among congregants who currently are unable or unwilling to 
participate in civic life. 
Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 289, 398–99 (2004). 
 141. For a thorough articulation of this theory, see Boris I. Bittker, Churches, Taxes and 
the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285, 1291 (1969). 
 142. Zelinsky, supra note 128, at 811 (quoting Yale Univ. v. Town of New Haven, 42 A. 
87, 91 (Conn. 1899)). 
 143. Id. at 810. Deductions are not counted as a subsidy under this model because they 
are simply one step in the process of measuring each taxpayer’s “income” for tax purposes. Id. 
(citing William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
309 (1972)). 
 144. See HOPKINS, supra note 129, at 14 (“Since the founding of the United States and 
beforehand in the colonial period, tax exemption—particularly with respect to religious 
organizations—was common. Churches were uniformly spared taxation.” (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added)). 
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significant social movements in our nation’s history began as 
religious movements under the direction of religious leaders.145
The separationist position also utilizes this model in arguing for 
the validity of the lobbying restrictions. This argument is built on the 
principle that churches are not part of the tax base because of the 
necessity of separating church and state. Separationists argue, 
however, that once churches violate this “wall of separation” and 
attempt to enter the realm of public legislation (a realm in which 
they do not belong and should not enter),146 they become politically 
responsible to the public and their activities and property must 
therefore be subject to taxation by the government. In other words, 
this interpretation of the model contends that churches are not part 
of the tax base unless they make themselves part of the tax base. If 
churches want a role in shaping public policy, they must pay the 
price that everyone else must pay for that opportunity.147
The problem with this separationist argument is that it ignores 
the special protections granted to churches and religious adherents 
by the First Amendment as recognized by the longstanding tradition 
of not taxing churches148 and of respecting the historic role of 
churches in the nation’s greatest social movements.149 If churches 
already have the right to freely express religious beliefs publicly, 
government cannot condition tax-exempt status on any substantial 
 145. See Dessingue, supra note 136, at 923 (“Churches have played a pivotal role in every 
important political struggle since (and including) national independence: the abolition of 
slavery, gambling, child labor, prostitution, temperance, the death penalty, the war in Vietnam, 
abortion, and civil rights.” (citations omitted)); David Saperstein, Jewish Perspectives on the Role 
of Religion in the Political Process, 1 J.L. & RELIG. 215, 220 (1983) (listing several historical 
movements in which church participation had a “determinative . . . impact” including “the 
antislavery movement, the temperance movement, the industrial reforms of the progressive era, 
the recognition of the labor movement . . . [and] the civil rights movement”). 
 146. The final main heading of Professor Murphy’s article is illustrative of this attitude: 
“Church Intervention and Participation in Political Activity Is Inadvisable and Unnecessary.” 
Murphy, supra note 11, at 75. In countering this separationist position, Professor Garnett 
posits that this do-not-get-involved argument is the very message that the restrictions 
themselves send to churches. Garnett, supra note 124, at 798. He refers to the system of 
conditional tax exemptions and political-speech restrictions as “the process by which 
government domesticates the churches’ evangelical vocation and convinces religion to see itself 
as a socially impotent force that does not belong in politics. The government tells faith 
communities that religion is a private matter, and, eventually, they come to believe it.” Id. 
 147. Murphy, supra note 11, at 75 (“There are ways for § 501(c)(3) organizations to 
make their voices heard politically. They simply may not use public money to do so.”). 
 148. See supra note 144. 
 149. See supra note 145. 
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burden of that right—even if these expressions have the goal of 
shaping public policy.150 Further, because “[r]eligious and political 
discourse is the center of the First Amendment right to free 
speech,”151 government should not be able to suddenly tax churches 
simply because they advocate legislation as an appropriate means of 
promoting religious doctrine. For these reasons, an interpretation of 
the lobbying restrictions adopting this model to define the tax base is 
likely to construe the restrictions in favor of churches. Still, neither 
courts nor the IRS have adopted this model as the policy defining 
the relationship between tax-exempt status and the restrictions. 
3. The accommodation model 
The accommodation model is another popular method of 
analyzing the conditions placed upon churches’ tax-exempt status.152 
Religious free-speech advocates contend that the tax-exempt status 
of churches is simply a religious accommodation that allows churches 
to operate freely without having financial burdens placed on them by 
the government.153 This position argues that by restricting churches’ 
ability to influence public policy as a condition of tax-exempt status, 
the government stifles rather than accommodates religious 
expression and exercise. An interpretation of the lobbying 
restrictions that respects the wide variety of religious traditions will 
also respect that the members of many faiths “incur an obligation to 
become active in the political arena.”154 Such an understanding also 
would accommodate churches and church leaders that feel an 
 150. The court in Sherbert v. Verner articulated this same principle in discussing when 
conditions placed on government benefits become unconstitutional burdens on First 
Amendment rights: 
It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be 
infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. . . . 
[C]onditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever 
their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. . . . 
“To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in 
effect to penalize them for such speech.” 
374 U.S. 398, 404–06 (1963) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518 (1958)) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 151. Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 262. 
 152. See Zelinsky, supra note 128, at 811–12 (grouping the accommodation and 
entanglement models together). 
 153. See id. at 807 (“[T]he First Amendment is best understood as permitting governments 
to refrain from taxation to accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and activities.”). 
 154. Ablin, supra note 11, at 573. 
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obligation to assist their members in applying religious doctrines to 
real-world issues, thus making it necessary to address modern policy 
debates in a religious setting.155
Separationists, however, argue that the tax-exempt status of 
churches serves the purpose of accommodating religion only 
inasmuch as churches provide secular charitable services that the 
government would otherwise have to provide.156 Under this view of 
the accommodation model, removing or relaxing the lobbying 
restrictions for churches would extend the benefits of tax-exempt 
status beyond the purpose for which they were intended—to include 
religion in a group of charitable organizations that provide necessary 
charitable services. Ultimately, application of this model depends on 
the permissible scope of government accommodation under the 
Establishment Clause. 
4. The entanglement model 
Other theorists have utilized a concept of government 
entanglement with religion to analyze the tax-exempt status of 
churches and the accompanying political speech restrictions. The 
central premise of this model is that “involving the IRS in day-to-day 
religious life . . . would threaten unnecessary infringements” of 
constitutional rights.157 Once again, both sides have used this 
concept to promote their views. For example, the separationists 
argue that removing or relaxing the political speech restrictions 
would “create[] a climate in which a church could encroach on 
politics, and politics could encroach on the activity of a church.”158 
Separationists support strict enforcement of the lobbying restrictions 
as means of removing the ability of both religion and government to 
trespass upon each other’s territory. 
Religious free-speech advocates also use the entanglement 
metaphor to demonstrate that “tax exemption does not subsidize 
 155. See id. at 573–74. 
 156. See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1989) (holding that 
tax exemptions must have a “secular purpose,” which may be “cultural, moral, or spiritual” but 
not “religious” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 697 (1979) (Harlan, J., 
concurring))); see also Charles Capetanakis, Abortion Rights Mobilization and Religious Tax 
Exemptions, 34 CATH. LAW. 169, 186 (1991). 
 157. Lee, supra note 4, at 427. 
 158. Murphy, supra note 11, at 81. 
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churches, but leaves them alone.”159 Under this notion, the lobbying 
restrictions inappropriately entangle the IRS’s regulatory powers 
with the religious freedoms of churches and their members. 
Professor Garnett effectively argues the negative effect that such 
government encroachment on religion causes in the context of the 
political speech restrictions: 
Government evaluates and characterizes what churches say and do, 
and decides both what it will recognize as religious and what it will 
label as political. The identification of certain activities by religious 
associations as inappropriate irruptions of faith into the political 
sphere, and the criteria used to identify such irruptions, allow 
government to tame religion, and to “blunt [its] political saliency,” 
by identifying what it is not.160
According to this view, the IRS’s attempt to draw lines between 
what is political and what is religious constitutes an improper 
entanglement with religion. In the end, the entanglement test may 
simply require a determination of which government action causes 
the least entanglement. As the Walz Court explained, “Either 
course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of 
involvement with religion. . . . Granting tax exemptions to churches 
necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic benefit and also 
gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing them.”161
Applying this balancing analysis to the lobbying restrictions, the 
result depends on which action creates the greater entanglement: a 
strict enforcement of the restrictions that would require increased 
government involvement in the affairs of churches or a narrow 
interpretation of the restrictions that would give tax-exempt 
churches greater sway in the policies of government. Common sense 
suggests that no bright-line answer to an entanglement analysis 
exists.162 However, a narrow interpretation of the lobbying 
restrictions that allows free and open communication between 
 159. Zelinsky, supra note 128, at 807. 
 160. Garnett, supra note 124, at 797–98 (quoting Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy: A 
"Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 275, 277 (1986)) 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
 161. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674–75 (1970). 
 162. See, e.g., James M. Dunn, The Christian as Political Activist, LIBERTY, July–Aug. 
1986, at 18 (“Where does one draw the line between mixing politics-religion and merging 
church-state? It is a popular question, often asked simply to shut off debate. The challenge 
works as a cutoff valve because there is no simple, easy, short answer.”). 
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churches and parishioners would result in less government 
entanglement with religion for two reasons: (1) the IRS would have 
no reason to enmesh itself in monitoring or regulating internal 
church communications regarding public policy issues; and (2) 
separationist groups would have less incentive to continually make 
frivolous claims to the IRS that churches that have communicated 
with parishioners regarding public policy issues have violated their 
tax-exempt status. 
5. The neutrality model 
Applying the principle of neutrality always raises questions of 
whether government can ever be truly neutral in dealing with 
religion. Nonetheless, both Congress and the courts continually 
return to the principle of neutrality to explain the underlying policies 
of law.163 Once again, both sides of the lobbying-restrictions debate 
use this principle to defend their positions. Separationists argue that 
to maintain neutrality in political and religious affairs, the revenue 
system must not allow tax-exempt churches to influence public 
policy by advancing their own political agenda. They contend that a 
revenue system without the lobbying restrictions on churches would 
violate neutrality by giving a special tax benefit to churches that 
might use the extra funds available to engage in partisan politics.164 
This argument, however, assumes that “[t]he restrictions imposed by 
section 501(c)(3) are viewpoint neutral.”165
 163. Since the Supreme Court’s use of neutrality in Everson v. Board of Education, the 
principle has been a staple of First Amendment jurisprudence. 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (“[The 
First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious 
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is 
no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.”). The Walz Court 
used the term “benevolent neutrality” to describe the central underlying policy of tax 
exemptions for religious organizations. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 676–77 (1970). 
In 1987, Congress declared the importance of neutrality as the basis of the political speech 
restrictions. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, at 1621, 1625 (1987), reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-1201, 2313-1205 (stating that 501(c)(3)’s political speech 
restrictions “reflect Congressional policies that the U.S. Treasury should be neutral in political 
affairs”). 
 164. Marci Hamilton argues that “[w]ithout the limitations on political activity, the 
exemptions would induce many organizations to claim some religious affiliation to benefit 
from the tax-exempt privilege, and religiously related organizations would have relatively more 
wealth than secular organizations (other than charitable organizations) to spend on political 
objectives.” Marci A. Hamilton, Free? Exercise, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 823, 864–65 (2001). 
 165. Murphy, supra note 11, at 73. 
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While the lobbying restrictions may be facially neutral, religious 
free-speech advocates argue that the restrictions have the non-neutral 
effect of silencing a large portion of society that would otherwise 
convey their religious beliefs in the political realm.166 This chilling 
effect is particularly harmful to churches because of the ambiguous 
tax code and regulatory provisions that do not offer a clear standard 
for what churches may or may not do. Those pushing for fewer 
restrictions on churches’ political speech posit that maintaining 
political and religious neutrality requires the government to allow 
churches and their members to freely engage in public debate and 
the shaping of public policy.167 True neutrality requires 
acknowledgment that the First Amendment guarantees the right of 
all groups and individuals not only to exercise freely their belief 
systems but also to petition the government to address political 
issues that affect those beliefs. Nonetheless, although the principle of 
neutrality has informed First Amendment jurisprudence for nearly six 
decades, a common understanding of how best to define and 
implement neutrality has eluded this debate.168
6. The autonomy model 
Perhaps the most useful model to analyze the lobbying 
restrictions is the model of autonomy.169 The principle of autonomy 
implies a sense of “self-direction, independence, and the ability to 
choose and implement a life plan.”170 Separationists focus on 
autonomy as a principle of independence in which church and state 
remain divided into separate spheres, thus establishing a system of 
“mutual noninterference by church and state in each other’s 
 166. See Garnett, supra note 124, at 778–83. 
 167. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 453, 475 (2000) (“The great solution to the republican problem was to promote public 
virtue indirectly, by protecting freedom of speech, association, and religion, and leaving the 
nation’s communities of belief free to inculcate their ideas of the good life, each in their own way.”). 
 168. Some have gone so far as to argue that the principle of neutrality has been more 
harmful than helpful. See, e.g., Gabriël A. Moens, The Menace of Neutrality in Religion, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 535, 536 (“[T]he neutrality principle ineffectively addresses the conflicts between 
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause and has largely removed religion from 
American public life by trivializing its existence.”). 
 169. For a thorough discussion of this model discussing the autonomy of the state, the 
autonomy of the church, and the autonomy of individuals, see Scharffs, supra note 120. 
 170. Id. at 1247. 
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affairs.”171 Under this separationist vision, not taxing churches and 
not allowing churches to exert influence in the legislative realm 
preserve the autonomy of both church and state by keeping the two 
separate in their appropriate spheres of influence. Encroachment by 
one on the other—such as occurs when tax-exempt religious groups 
engage in political lobbying efforts—would disrupt this delicate 
balance of autonomous coexistence.172 The irony of this argument, 
however, is that “requiring strict independence of church and state 
would not only permit, but also probably guarantee, tax-exempt 
status to churches.”173
Others would view tax exemptions for religious organizations as 
“a recognition of sectarian autonomy.”174 Religious free-speech 
advocates point to the violation of church autonomy that occurs by 
conditioning tax-exempt status on their political silence: “Our 
government exercises its power to tax precisely by conditionally 
exempting churches from taxation. It labels their expression and 
activity according to its own terms and, in so doing, ‘destroy[s]’ 
authentically religious consciousness and undermines the mediating 
structures of civil society.”175 In essence, government is “legislating 
which religious beliefs can be expressed openly in houses of worship 
and which cannot.”176 Thus, fundamental to preserving church 
autonomy is allowing churches to participate in the development of 
public policy, especially regarding those issues that are relevant not 
only to a church’s management, structure, and operation but also to 
its doctrine and religious practices: 
In “attempting to influence legislation” churches speak to the 
moral aspects of political issues. Such witness flows directly from 
fundamental faith and is integral to its free exercise. It is essential to 
the church’s identity and mission, and to the moral authority of its 
 171. See id. at 1248–51 (quoting NORMAN REDLICH, JOHN ATTANASIO & JOEL K. 
GOLDSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505 (2d ed. 1999)). 
 172. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (“The hazards of churches 
supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of government 
supporting churches . . . .”). 
 173. Scharffs, supra note 120, at 1263 (emphasis omitted). 
 174. Zelinsky, supra note 128, at 840. 
 175. Garnett, supra note 124, at 802 (alteration in original). 
 176. Galston, supra note 140, at 398 (citing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF 
DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 147 
(1993)). 
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pronouncements, that it speak as “church” through its religious 
structures and leaders.177
Without this ability, the balance spoken of by the courts is displaced 
by the domination of the State’s standards for appropriate religious 
speech,178 which directly violates the principle of autonomy. 
7. A summary of the models 
While some of these models of analysis are more useful than 
others, each offers a unique perspective in characterizing the 
relationship between churches’ tax-exempt status and the lobbying 
restrictions of § 501(c)(3). Whether tax-exempt status is viewed as 
offering a subsidy or defining the relevant tax base, those 
interpreting the lobbying restrictions should consider the principles 
of entanglement, accommodation, neutrality, and autonomy that 
underlie these relationships. Each of these models underscores the 
difficulty of separating religious values and practices from political 
agendas and activities.179  
While neither the arguments of the religious free-speech 
advocates nor those of the separationists are likely to succeed in 
producing any substantial statutory change to § 501(c)(3)’s lobbying 
restrictions, these arguments do point out the need for answers to 
two key remaining questions. First, at what point does appropriate 
religious issue advocacy become improper political lobbying? This 
question is a query of both the boundaries of the insubstantiality test 
and the difference between religious speech and political lobbying. 
Second, and probably more important, do the lobbying restrictions 
place any restraints on the relationship or communication between a 
 177. 200TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (USA), GOD ALONE 
IS LORD OF THE CONSCIENCE 36 (1988), reprinted in 8 J.L. & RELIG. 331, 364–65 (1990) . 
 178. Professor Garnett opines that “[b]y determining for its own purposes the meaning 
of religious communities’ statements and activities, and by enforcing the distinctions it draws, 
government subtly reshapes religious consciousness itself.” Garnett, supra note 124, at 796. 
“In other words, by telling religion what it may say, really is saying, or will be deemed to have 
said, and by telling faith where it belongs, government molds religion’s own sense of what it 
is.” Id. 
 179. Professor Ablin argues that “[g]iven the right of religious believers to publicly 
present religious arguments, the contributions that religious viewpoints can make to political 
culture, and the centrality of religious beliefs to personality, it is unfair and often impossible to 
separate one’s religious perspective from one’s political viewpoint.” Ablin, supra note 11, at 
576. Interestingly, what is deemed impossible on an individual level is precisely what the 
lobbying restrictions attempt to do at an organizational level with churches. 
3ANDERSEN.FIN 4/8/2006 2:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
154 
 
church and its members? These unanswered questions illustrate the 
need for guidelines that protect the religious rights of churches and 
their members to communicate freely regarding key moral and 
religious issues as well as the political processes affecting those issues. 
B. Empty Threats and the Need for Guidelines 
that Narrowly Interpret the Restrictions 
Although one possible consequence of the vagueness of the 
lobbying restrictions might have been abuse by the IRS, this has not 
been the case historically. Instead, the lack of a clear standard by 
which to measure the extent and effects of church attempts to 
influence legislation has provided a pseudo-protection for churches. 
This is because courts and the IRS generally have construed these 
ambiguous regulatory requirements in favor of churches, which have 
been provided no clear ceiling of permissible lobbying activity. 
Without development of clear standards to define the limitations of 
churches’ lobbying efforts, the statutory sword of 501(c)(3)—relied 
on by separationists to purge the policy-making process of any 
significant religious influence—has proven more analogous to a 
toothpick in the hands of the IRS. As a result, the IRS has shied 
away from enforcing a standard that neither it nor Congress is 
willing to define. Instead, the IRS has pursued action only when 
501(c)(3) entities have clearly abused their tax-exempt status by 
using religion as a front to advance a purely partisan, nonreligious 
agenda.180
Despite this lack of aggressive enforcement, separationists 
seeking to remove religious influences from politics continue to hurl 
threats at churches, warning that attempts to influence public policy 
risk immediate loss of tax-exempt status. As mentioned above, some 
groups have gone so far as to suggest sending spies to church 
meetings to ensure that religious discussion does not enter the 
political domain.181 It is these activities and misinformation that chill 
important religious speech in the policy-making process and 
therefore pose the greatest threat to church autonomy. Such a result 
necessitates action by either Congress or the IRS to stop these empty 
 180. See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855–
56 (10th Cir. 1973) (revoking the tax-exempt status of a religious 501(c)(3) organization for 
engaging in extensive lobbying and political campaigning). 
 181. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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threats. Even without further legislative or regulatory action, church 
leaders need to educate themselves about the lobbying restrictions 
and understand that the law, as it currently stands, protects their 
right to speak freely about modern political issues. 
Nevertheless, while “the notion that churches may not be 
involved actively in politics is . . . inaccurate, misleading, and 
incomplete,”182 some additional guidelines are necessary. Many 
religious advocates might worry that pushing for a change in this 
area of the law would disrupt the status quo and allow for additional 
government regulation of religion. Because churches have 
maintained relatively quiet enjoyment to engage in “insubstantial” 
attempts to shape public policy on issues of moral concern, this 
Comment does not argue that the IRS or Congress should establish 
a percentage test for determining the point at which a church’s 
lobbying activities become a violation of § 501(c)(3). To do so 
would invite a significant number of audits of churches’ finances and 
activities as well as promote additional harmful regulation of religion. 
Even an ambiguous insubstantiality test would be better than major 
intrusions into the private financial affairs of religious entities. 
Instead of establishing a percentage test, however, Congress or 
the IRS should establish guidelines183 that narrowly interpret the 
lobbying restriction in favor of churches that wish to take strong 
stances on issues of moral and religious concern. These guidelines 
should at a minimum declare that the lobbying restrictions do not 
seek to regulate communications between church leaders and 
members regarding the application of religious beliefs to current 
political issues. Churches and church leaders should have an 
unrestricted ability to communicate to members on public policy 
issues that are of religious or moral concern. Many would argue that 
the current status of the lobbying restriction does nothing to affect 
this right. While this may be true, it has not stopped the harmful 
threats of separationist groups against churches—threats that have 
stifled religious speech to some degree. A clear recognition of these 
 182. Cook, supra note 11, at 457 (citation omitted). 
 183. These guidelines could come in the form of IRS regulations, revenue rulings, or 
even statutory amendments. The creation of such guidelines for the sole benefit of churches is 
nothing new to the IRS, which already offers substantial protections exclusively to churches. 
See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text; see also Ablin, supra note 11, at 581 (“Because 
of the First Amendment’s specific affirmation of religious freedom, perhaps Congress is 
warranted in implementing a separate set of laws unique to religious organizations.”). 
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First Amendment rights in guidelines that interpret or define the 
political speech restrictions would vitiate most, if not all, of these 
threats. 
In addition, the guidelines should also protect the right of 
churches not only to teach about moral issues but also to suggest 
how members might take action on these issues and to invite 
members to do so. Without the right to inform parishioners about 
the decisive moral battles that occur in the legislative process and to 
urge them to get involved in that process, the right to teach about 
these policy issues would have relatively little substance. In essence, 
churches would be telling their members, “Yes, we believe strongly 
in this important principle (e.g., abortion, marriage, pornography), 
but we can’t tell you that you can or should do anything about it 
because that would cost us dearly.” With guidelines in place that 
protect internal church communications, churches would be free to 
engage in open discussion with their members without the unsettling 
fear that doing so will cause them to lose their tax-exempt status. 
The government as an institution would also benefit from such a 
position by empowering a great stabilizing force in society to 
participate more easily in the debates that shape public policy.184 
Instituting these guidelines would provide recognition that 
“[r]eligious communities are crucial sources for the kind of counter-
speech that liberal governments should expect and free societies 
require.”185 Thus, rather than silencing religious voices to achieve the 
independence of government, one of the best ways to foster political 
prosperity186 is to remove the restraints that inhibit “the ability of 
some key actors in society from fully participating and contributing 
to the political process.”187 Guidelines that protect the sanctity of the 
relationship between a church and its members would promote the 
 184. As David Saperstein has argued, “[T]he religious community can play an influential 
role in defining the public’s moral perception of the particular issue in keeping with our 
traditional values and goals.” Saperstein, supra note 145, at 220. 
 185. Garnett, supra note 124, at 800–01. 
 186. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 187. Ablin, supra note 11, at 587; see also Dessingue, supra note 136, at 923–24 
(“Through the religious liberty protections engraved in the First Amendment, the Founders 
intended a society that would honor the tensions of religious pluralism, not eliminate them. 
The ‘wall’ of separation between church and state is merely metaphor. ‘Religion cannot . . . be 
confined by legal fiction.’” (citation omitted)).  
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principle of autonomy by recognizing the true “inter-independence” 
that defines the appropriate relationship between church and state.188
IV. THE LDS EXPERIENCE 
Although abstract principles and differing interpretations provide 
a somewhat clearer vision of the problems associated with the 
lobbying restrictions, a concrete example is helpful to demonstrate 
how churches, Congress, courts, and the IRS might apply these 
concepts. The recent experience of The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints (“LDS Church” or “Church”)189 provides a useful 
template for analyzing the lobbying restrictions for several reasons.  
First, as is true with many other churches, the LDS Church is not 
politically active but has remained politically neutral in the sense that 
it does not endorse, support, or oppose any political candidates or 
parties.190 The Church has, however, taken positions on a number of 
legislative issues that Church leaders deem moral and religious.191 
These rare and somewhat ad hoc ventures into the shaping of public 
policy make the LDS Church a suitable example of a church that is 
 188. Professor Scharffs uses the term “inter-independence” to describe the concept of 
autonomy that includes notions of independence, inclusion, mutual respect, and 
empowerment. See Scharffs, supra note 120, at 1253–58. Each of these principles play a key 
role in shaping the current understanding of the lobbying restrictions under the several 
analytical models described in Part III.A. 
 189. For purposes of full disclosure, the author is a member of the LDS Church. 
However, any statements or opinions expressed are entirely the result of the author’s 
independent analysis of the issues and facts herein presented. 
 190. See LDS.org, Church Remains Politically Neutral, Urges Members to Vote Wisely, 
http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showpackage/0,15367,3899-1--44-2-519,00.html (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Church Remains Politically Neutral]. 
 191. In October, 1999, LDS Church President Gordon B. Hinckley offered this 
explanation of the Church’s involvement in legislative issues: 
  I have time to discuss one other question: “Why does the Church become 
involved in issues that come before the legislature and the electorate?” 
  . . . [W]e deal only with those legislative matters which are of a strictly moral 
nature or which directly affect the welfare of the Church. We have opposed 
gambling and liquor and will continue to do so. We regard it as not only our right 
but our duty to oppose those forces which we feel undermine the moral fiber of 
society. Much of our effort, a very great deal of it, is in association with others 
whose interests are similar. We have worked with Jewish groups, Catholics, Muslims, 
Protestants, and those of no particular religious affiliation, in coalitions formed to 
advocate positions on vital moral issues. 
Gordon B. Hinckley, Why We Do Some of the Things We Do, ENSIGN, Nov. 1999, available at 
http://lds.org/conference/talk/display/0,5232,23-1-14-21,00.html.  
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not politically active but that takes strong positions when important 
moral and religious issues are at stake.192  
Second, the LDS Church’s advocacy of these positions has 
included some degree of direct and indirect lobbying activities, 
which range from offering direct monetary support to simply issuing 
statements on public policy issues. Many of these efforts have 
resulted in pejorative and immediate calls for the revocation of the 
Church’s tax-exempt status,193 thus making the Church a suitable 
candidate for exploring the lobbying restrictions. 
Third, the population of LDS Church members is substantially 
varied in different regions of the country such that Church members 
enjoy the status of a powerful majority in some communities and 
only a viable political minority in other areas. This factor provides an 
opportunity to examine the impact of lobbying restrictions on 
churches with varying degrees of political capability in different 
geographic locations. 
Finally, some scholars have labeled LDS members as political 
“dry kindling”194 because of their devotion and often quick reaction 
to what they see as divinely inspired counsel from modern-day 
prophets and apostles.195 Because of their generally high level of 
 192. Several other churches and religious groups have engaged in lobbying activities that 
far exceed those of the LDS Church. See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 
http://www.usccb.org; Baptist Joint Committee for Religious Liberty, http://www.bjcpa.org; 
Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, http://rac.org; The United Methodist General 
Board of Church and Society, http://www.umc-gbcs.org; Ethics and Religious Liberty 
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, http://www.erlc.com. However, the purpose 
of this Comment is not to establish a bright-line rule for determining the point at which a 
church’s lobbying activities violate the provisions of § 501(c)(3). Instead, this Part is directed 
at those churches that are not politically active to a great extent but feel they have a duty to 
make their voices known. The ambiguity of the lobbying restrictions as well as the empty 
threats of separationist groups have the greatest silencing effect on these types of churches. 
 193. See, e.g., Edward Epstein, Supervisor Hits Mormons for Politicking, S.F. CHRON., July 
7, 1999, at A13 (reporting San Francisco Supervisor Mark Leno’s opinion that the church’s 
activities were “a gross abuse of [its] tax-exempt status” and noting Mr. Leno’s actions in 
calling for an IRS investigation of the Church for its activities during California’s Proposition 
22 campaign). See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 194. See David E. Campbell & J. Quin Monson, Dry Kindling: A Political Profile of 
American Mormons, in FROM PEWS TO POLLING PLACES: FAITH AND POLITICS IN THE 
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS MOSAIC (J. Matthew Wilson ed., forthcoming 2006) [hereinafter Dry 
Kindling], available at http://www.nd.edu/~dcampbe4/dry%20kindling.pdf (discussing the 
reasons for the political force that the LDS population represents). 
 195. Some exceptions to this loyalty have occurred. For example, in 1933 Utah was the 
thirty-sixth state to ratify the Twenty-first Amendment repealing Prohibition. Despite the 
strong and vocal opposition to repeal by then Prophet and President Heber J. Grant and the 
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loyalty and commitment to the Church, members often take notice 
when Church leaders speak out on issues such as gambling, abortion, 
pornography, and the legal definition of marriage. Although LDS 
Church leaders rarely apply their stamp of approval on any political 
cause, small acts or statements from these leaders can have a 
significant effect in shaping public policy. 
For these reasons, the LDS Church is an excellent case study for 
analyzing the application of the lobbying restrictions. This Part 
explores not only the modern history of LDS involvement in the 
legislative process but also the issues raised in applying the lobbying 
restrictions to a specific set of facts. This analysis suggests that 
churches that engage in insubstantial policy lobbying are not in any 
real danger of losing their tax-exempt status under the current 
regime and therefore should not give credence to the empty threats 
of separationist groups seeking to strip churches’ tax-exempt status. 
Despite this relative safety, the ambiguity of the lobbying restrictions 
has had a chilling effect on religious speech because of widespread 
misunderstanding and misinformation regarding how churches may 
participate in shaping public policy. This silencing effect necessitates 
clarification by the IRS or Congress to protect fundamental religious 
freedoms, including the right of church leaders to communicate 
freely with church members. 
A. Background on LDS Political Activity 
Attempts to shape public policy through active political pursuits 
are not a recent development in the LDS Church. The vast majority 
of these efforts has consisted of internal Church communications 
among LDS leadership and members. For example, in 1933 Church 
leaders unsuccessfully urged Church members to fight the passage of 
the Twenty-first Amendment, the constitutional repeal of 
fact that LDS membership constituted sixty-six percent of Utah’s population, sixty-two percent 
of Utahns supported repeal, which gave the amendment the three-quarter supermajority of 
states needed for ratification. See David E. Campbell and J. Quin Monson, Following the 
Leader? Mormon Voting on Ballot Propositions 4–5 (Univ. of Notre Dame Program in Am. 
Democracy, Working Paper No. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Following the Leader], available at 
http://americandemocracy.nd.edu/working_papers/files/following_the_leader.pdf (explaining 
the reasons for the split among LDS voters over Prohibition); see also Gordon B. Hinckley, 
Loyalty, ENSIGN, May 2003, at 58, available at http://lds.org/conference/ 
talk/display/0,5232,23-1-353-21,00.html (discussing the sadness of Church leaders over the 
lack of members’ support for the Church’s position). 
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Prohibition.196 Later, with more success, the Church strongly 
admonished Church members and the general public in 1968 to 
oppose a referendum that sought to remove the ban on alcohol sales 
in Utah bars and restaurants.197 Indeed, in recent decades the 
Church has taken stances on a broad range of issues including local 
moral controversies such as legalized betting on horse races198 and 
the establishment of a state lottery in Idaho,199 broader social debates 
such as the Equal Rights Amendment200 and the legal definition of 
marriage,201 and public safety concerns such as the placement of MX 
missiles202 and the storage of nuclear waste in Utah.203
The Church’s involvement in the majority of these issues has 
merely consisted of issuing official Church statements rather than 
engaging in direct lobbying efforts. While a number of these 
statements are meant to “reflect church teachings and practices,” 
other Church statements announcing “positions on matters of public 
policy do not rise to the level of doctrinal declarations.”204 Some 
have argued that merely taking a position on such political issues is 
inappropriate, arguing that such official church stances are the 
equivalent of telling church members how to vote.205 However, 
Church leaders have repeatedly declared the Church’s policy of not 
 196. See Following the Leader, supra note 195. 
 197. See id. at 5–6. 
 198. Dan Harrie & Peggy Fletcher Stack, LDS Church Turns up Heat on Horse-Race 
Betting, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 1, 1992, at A1.  
 199. See Following the Leader, supra note 195, at 20–21; see also Associated Press, Local 
Anti-Lottery Campaign Defended, DESERET NEWS, Nov. 17, 1988, at B4. 
 200. See O. Kendall White, Jr., Mormonism and the Equal Rights Amendment, 31 J. 
CHURCH & ST. 249 (1989) (offering an overview of the LDS Church’s opposition to the 
ERA). 
 201. See infra Part III.B. 
 202. Mormons Reject the MX Missile in Their Backyard, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1981, at A4. 
 203. Joe Bauman, LDS Church Opposes N-site, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 12, 2005, at B1. 
 204. Bob Bernick, Jr., 2 Sides Duel over a Utah Flat Tax, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 16, 2005 
(statement of church spokesman Dale Bills). 
 205. See, e.g., Dan Egan, For Some, Mormon Stance on Gay Issue Creates a Crisis of 
Conscience, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 5, 2000, at A1 (quoting a disillusioned church member as 
saying, “When my church tells me how to vote or where to spend my political dollars, it takes 
away from my opportunity to worship and consider God in my life.”); see also D. Michael 
Quinn, Prelude to the National “Defense of Marriage,” 33 DIALOGUE: J. MORMON THOUGHT, 
Fall 2000, at 2, 13 (alleging that “most Mormons act like army ants whenever LDS 
headquarters gives instructions about political matters”). 
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telling its members how to vote on specific issues.206 Further, the 
Church vigorously claims the right to take strong positions on moral 
issues in the political realm,207 to educate its members on these 
issues,208 and to encourage them to be supportive of and loyal to 
those positions.209
Some might question whether these statements or other 
communications among church leaders and members qualify as 
attempts to influence legislation. However, as discussed above, such 
attempts by churches to speak out on important issues of public 
policy210 or to teach and inform parishioners about key doctrines and 
their relationship to current social and moral debates211 do not and 
should not have any weight in establishing a church’s tax-exempt 
status. By leaving churches outside the scope of statutory provisions 
 206. See Church Remains Politically Neutral, supra note 190 (reaffirming the Church’s 
longstanding policy of “absolute freedom of the individual from the domination of 
ecclesiastical authority in political affairs” and reminding all that “[t]he Church does not 
extend reprimands or ecclesiastical punishment to persons who choose not to support its views 
on [political] issues”). 
 207. Id. (“When fundamental moral issues are at stake or compelling issues arise that 
threaten the traditional family, the Church does not hesitate to take a stand.”). 
 208. Id. (citing the position of Dallin H. Oaks that “if churches or church leaders choose 
to oppose or favor a particular piece of legislation, their opinions should be received on the 
same basis as the opinions offered by other knowledgeable organizations or persons”). 
 209. Church leaders such as President Gordon B. Hinckley have often spoken of the 
difference between telling church members what to do and urging them to be supportive of 
and loyal to the Church and the doctrines it teaches: 
Now may I say a word concerning loyalty to the Church. We see much indifference. 
There are those who say, “The Church won’t dictate to me how to think about this, 
that, or the other, or how to live my life.” No, I reply, the Church will not dictate 
to any man how he should think or what he should do. The Church will point out 
the way and invite every member to live the gospel and enjoy the blessings that 
come of such living. The Church will not dictate to any man, but it will counsel, it 
will persuade, it will urge, and it will expect loyalty from those who profess 
membership therein. 
Hinckley, supra note 195, at 60. 
 210. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Once again, the IRS does not take the 
position that church leaders are “prohibited from speaking about important issues of public 
policy.” TAX GUIDE, supra note 19, at 7. Thus, the lobbying restrictions likely do not prohibit 
official church statements about public policy issues, especially when such statements do not 
mention specific legislation. 
 211. See supra text accompanying notes 183–188; see also supra Part II.B.2.c. This 
Comment does not contend that religious organizations should be able to use tax-exempt 
funds to engage in unlimited political lobbying. However, the law should never classify internal 
communications between church leaders and members as “lobbying” subject to the lobbying 
restrictions—even if those communications encourage members to get involved outside of the 
church in key policy debates or political processes. 
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regulating communications between tax-exempt organizations and 
their members,212 Congress made a conscious decision not to 
regulate internal church relationships in the tax code. Thus, churches 
are free to make such official statements and to discuss policy issues 
with parishioners without risking the loss of their tax-exempt status. 
B. The LDS Church’s Involvement in the Marriage Battle 
In recent years, the LDS Church appears to have taken an 
approach to its involvement in political affairs that is both cautiously 
conservative and confidently resolute.213 In doing so, the Church has 
picked its political battles carefully and, for the most part, has taken a 
low-key approach to its involvement.214 Nonetheless, the Church has 
been unabashed in supporting its positions after it has made a 
decision to become involved.215 Probably the greatest controversy 
has stemmed from the Church’s involvement with marriage and 
family issues—especially its ardent support for those measures that 
protect the traditional definition of marriage as the union of a man 
 212. See supra Part II.B.2.c. (explaining that the tax code explicitly excludes churches 
from the definition of lobbying that restricts internal communications between a nonprofit 
organization and its members that encourage members either to engage in their own lobbying 
efforts or persuade nonmembers to do so). 
 213. Overall, the Church has shied away from entering political frays unless such action is 
absolutely necessary. See Church Remains Politically Neutral, supra note 190 (“But the Church 
rarely chooses to involve itself in politics, even though it is often implored to do so. ‘Scarcely a 
week passes that we are not importuned to lend our voice and strength to one cause or another 
of significance on a state, national or international level,’ President Hinckley said. ‘But we must 
restrain ourselves lest we become diverted from the great central mission of the Church given 
us by the Lord.’”). 
 214. Generally, the Church has been reticent to get involved in legislative matters. See, 
e.g., Lucinda Dillon & Bob Bernick, Jr., Church Uses Its Clout Subtly—and Seldom, DESERET 
NEWS, May 17, 2001, at A1 (quoting Governor Mike Leavitt’s understanding that LDS 
Church leaders “spend a lot more time trying to keep the church out of [political affairs] than 
get them into things”). Professors Campbell and Monson argue that “this strategy of keeping a 
low profile is the modus operandi of LDS Church leaders on contemporary issues.” Following 
the Leader, supra note 195, at 23. 
 215. See, e.g., LDS.org, Church Perspective on Alcohol Legislation in Utah, Feb. 12, 2003, 
http://www.lds.org/newsroom/showrelease/0,15503,4044-1-15428,00.html (citing the 
statement of Church attorney Jerry D. Fenn on alcohol laws in Utah and stating that “[t]he 
Church makes no apology for its interest and participation in the legislative process where it 
comes to public policy issues involving moral issues” and that “[t]he Church will not abdicate 
what it views as a moral imperative to participate in sharing its concerns about alcohol policy 
and laws”). 
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and a woman.216 The bulk of the Church’s activities in defending 
traditional marriage has taken place during ballot initiatives, public 
referenda, or other legislative processes in several Western states 
including Alaska, California, Hawaii, Montana, and Nevada.217 This 
Section briefly examines the LDS Church’s major efforts in the 
marriage arena in light of modern interpretations of the lobbying 
restrictions.218
1. Protecting marriage in Alaska and Hawaii 
The LDS Church’s lobbying efforts in Alaska and Hawaii not 
only are rare examples of the Church offering direct monetary 
support to “political causes” but also provide an opportunity to 
apply the insubstantiality test.219 In the fall of 1998, the Church 
donated $600,000 to a political action group in Hawaii known as 
Save Traditional Marriage, which supported a proposed amendment 
to the Hawaii Constitution giving the state legislature rather than 
the courts the authority to legally define marriage.220 During the 
 216. In discussing the issue at the Church’s October 1999 Conference, Gordon B. 
Hinckley articulated the Church’s position on this issue: 
God-sanctioned marriage between a man and a woman has been the basis of 
civilization for thousands of years. There is no justification to redefine what marriage 
is. Such is not our right, and those who try will find themselves answerable to God. 
Some portray legalization of so-called same-sex marriage as a civil right. This is not a 
matter of civil rights; it is a matter of morality. Others question our constitutional 
right as a church to raise our voice on an issue that is of critical importance to the 
future of the family. We believe that defending this sacred institution by working to 
preserve traditional marriage lies clearly within our religious and constitutional 
prerogatives. Indeed, we are compelled by our doctrine to speak out. 
Hinckley, supra note 191. The Church’s first official call for legislative and judicial protection 
of traditional marriage came in a statement from the Church’s First Presidency in February, 
1994, asking members to “appeal to legislators, judges and other government officials to 
preserve the purposes and sanctity of marriage between a man and a woman and to reject all 
efforts to give legal authorization or other official approval or support to marriages between 
persons of the same gender.” See LDS First Presidency Opposes Legalization of Gay Marriages, 
DESERET NEWS, Feb. 14, 1994, at B1. For more information on the Church’s official positions 
on marriage and family, see THE FAMILY: A PROCLAMATION TO THE WORLD, available at 
http://www.lds.org/library/display/0,4945,105-1-11-1,00.html. 
 217. Brooke Adams, LDS Backs Amendment Against Gay Marriages, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
July 8, 2004, at A1. 
 218. An examination of the issues involved in the marriage debate is beyond the scope of 
this analysis. This Section explores only the LDS Church’s efforts to shape public policy in this area. 
 219. See supra Part II.B.3 (outlining the insubstantiality test). 
 220. See Patty Henetz, LDS Cash Carries Gay-Marriage Fight, SALT LAKE TRIB., Oct. 26, 
1998, at A1. 
3ANDERSEN.FIN 4/8/2006 2:13 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
164 
 
debate over a similar 1998 amendment in Alaska that proposed 
allowing legal recognition of marriages only between a man and a 
woman, the Church donated $500,000 to the Alaska Family 
Coalition.221 Two years earlier, the LDS Church and the Catholic 
Church had backed a nondenominational coalition in Hawaii known 
as Future Today, which opposed the legalization of same-sex 
marriage, prostitution, and gambling.222 The Church again defended 
its activities, arguing that “when a political issue has moral overtones, 
the Church has not only the right but the responsibility to speak out 
and become involved.”223
While the Church’s donations in Hawaii and Alaska arguably 
could fit into the regulations’ examples of lobbying contacts with the 
public,224 they likely do not exceed the hurdle established by the 
insubstantiality test. Under a pure percentage test, $1.1 million in 
donations clearly would not amount to a substantial percentage of 
the Church’s annual expenditures—even if such a calculation was 
based on the Church’s activities in a specific geographic location 
such as Hawaii or California. A Time Magazine article in 1997 
calculated that the Church possessed “a minimum of $30 billion” in 
assets, brought in an “estimated $5.9 billion in annual gross 
income,” and spent “billions to erect 350 church-size meetinghouses 
a year” as well as building several temples and maintaining a massive 
missionary program.225
An argument might be made that the donations were still 
substantial because of the effect they had on these referenda in 
successfully promoting the position for which the Church donated 
the funds. The difficulty with this assertion is three-fold. First, it is 
virtually impossible to prove the effect that the donation had on the 
overall campaign. Second, neither the IRS nor the courts are likely to 
adopt a rule that would punish only those churches that are 
successful in their lobbying activities. Finally, the insubstantiality test 
 221. Yereth Rosen, Mormons Join Alaska Campaign To Ban Gay Marriage, REUTERS, 
October 1, 1998, available at http://members.tripod.com/~no_on_2/rns1001.html. 
 222. See Mike Cannon, LDS and Catholic Coalition Opposes Hawaii Legislation, DESERET 
NEWS, Feb. 21, 1996, at B1. 
 223. Tony Semerad, A Mormon Crusade in Hawaii: Church Aims To End Gay Union, 
SALT LAKE TRIB., June 9, 1996, at B1 (quoting an LDS Church statement on its activities in 
Hawaii in defense of marriage). 
 224. See supra note 82–83 and accompanying text. 
 225. David Van Biema, Kingdom Come, TIME, Aug. 4, 1997. The Church did not 
confirm the accuracy of these figures. 
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does not question whether the lobbying activities themselves are 
substantial, but whether they constitute a substantial part of a 
church’s overall activities. In any case, the Church’s donations in 
Hawaii and Alaska most likely did not approach a level that could 
have jeopardized the Church’s tax-exempt status. 
2. California and the fight over Proposition 22 
One of the most notable LDS efforts in the political realm was 
during the debate over California’s Defense of Marriage Act, or 
Proposition 22. Although the Church’s involvement in this debate 
took a much more internal approach, Church activities raised far 
greater attention at the public level.226 Rather than donating any 
money to a group or organization, the Church simply sent out three 
letters to local Church leaders in California.227 On May 11, 1999, the 
presidency of the Church’s North America West Area sent out the 
first letter, which outlined the Church’s longstanding position on 
traditional marriage, described the basic provisions of Proposition 
22, and asked Church members “to do all you can by donating your 
means and time to assure a successful vote.”228 This letter was read 
aloud to adult members in California during Church services.229
A second letter dated May 20, 1999, authored by Douglas L. 
Callister, an attorney and regional ecclesiastical leader (“area 
authority seventy”) of the Church, was sent out to some local leaders 
(“stake presidents”) with specific instructions on how these leaders 
could act individually to raise money and otherwise elicit support for 
 226. The media hype caused by the LDS Church’s position was enormous. See, e.g., 
Associated Press, Californians Vote Against Gay Marriages, 61%–39%, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 8, 
2000, at A01; Zachary Coile, Mormons Raise Funds To Stop Gay Marriage, S.F. EXAMINER, 
Aug. 8, 1999, at A1; Egan, supra note 205; Thomas D. Elias, Mormon Church Backs 
California’s Gay ‘Marriage’ Foes, WASH. TIMES, July 18, 1999, at C2; Epstein, supra note 
193, at A13; Elaine Herscher, Mormon Church Assailed on Gay Marriage Stand, S.F. CHRON., 
Sept. 24, 1999, at A1; John Krist, Sex, Faith, and Oppression, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERV., 
Feb. 24, 2000, available at www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=KRIST24-
02-24-00; LDS Urged To Back Ban on Gay Marriage, DESERET NEWS, July 5, 1999, at A02; 
Carrie A. Moore, California Polls: A Prop. 22 Win, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 5, 2000, at A01; 
Robert Salladay, Mormons Now Target California: Church Asks Members To Back State Ballot 
Initiative, S.F. EXAMINER, July 4, 1999, at A1. 
 227. Letter from John B. Dickson, John O. Madsen, and Cecil O. Samuelson to LDS 
Priesthood leaders in California, May 11, 1999 (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Area 
Presidency letter]; see also Coile, supra note 226. 
 228. Coile, supra note 226. 
 229. See Area Presidency letter, supra note 227. 
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Proposition 22.230 The letter reminded Church leaders that “[i]n 
every instance the contribution of a Church member will be 
voluntary and in his capacity as a private citizen” and that “[n]o 
undue pressure of any type should be applied.”231 In addition, the 
letter mandated that the fundraising process be completely separated 
from Church meetings, activities, and property.232 Finally, in January 
2000, the area presidency sent a third letter, which was similar to the 
first, reminding Church members about the March 7 vote and 
urging them to continue their support for Proposition 22. 
Although the Church’s level of official activity in the Proposition 
22 initiative was relatively minimal, one author has labeled this effort 
as “the most direct involvement ever for a large religious 
organization in California’s populist lawmaking process.”233 This 
activity led to immediate calls for an IRS investigation of the 
Church’s tax-exempt status.234 Mark Leno, the San Francisco 
Supervisor and homosexual-rights activist called the letter “a gross 
abuse of [the Church’s] tax-exempt status.”235 Leno authored a 
resolution passed by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors calling 
on the IRS “to investigate whether the Mormon Church violated its 
tax-exempt status by getting directly involved in raising money for the 
initiative campaign.”236
Despite these claims, determining whether these letters violated 
the lobbying restrictions requires a more detailed analysis. The first 
question is whether the Church’s activities constituted “attempts to 
influence legislation” as defined by the regulations.237 If the 
restriction against urging the “public”238 to engage in lobbying 
 230. Letter from Douglas L. Callister to LDS Stake Presidents in California (May 20, 
1999) (copy on file with author) [hereinafter Callister Letter]; see also Coile, supra note 226. 
 231. Callister Letter, supra note 230. 
 232. Id. (“No fundraising may take place on Church property, through use of Church 
letterhead, or by virtue of general announcements in Church meetings.”). 
 233. Elias, supra note 226. 
 234. See Epstein, supra note 193. 
 235. Coile, supra note 226; see also Elias, supra note 226. 
 236. Coile, supra note 226. 
 237. No further analysis is necessary if the activity does not constitute an attempt to 
influence legislation. Recall that according to the regulations, an organization has attempted to 
influence legislation if it “(a) [c]ontacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a 
legislative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or opposing legislation; or (b) 
[a]dvocates the adoption or rejection of legislation.” Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a)–(b) 
(as amended in 1990). 
 238. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(a). 
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activities includes church members, then this question should likely 
be answered in the affirmative. However, as discussed above, 
Congress explicitly excepted churches from any code provision 
regulating the internal communications between a tax-exempt entity 
and its members.239 Nonetheless, despite the discrepancy in the IRS’s 
position,240 the letters might have constituted an attempt to 
“[a]dvocate[] the adoption or rejection of legislation”241 and 
therefore possibly fall within the purview of the lobbying restrictions. 
Thus, the more important analysis again falls under the 
insubstantiality test.242 Once again, the time and costs involved in 
preparing and sending these three letters were likely insufficient to 
rise to the level of a “substantial part” of the Church’s activities.243 
Therefore, under a straightforward percentage test, the letters clearly 
do not violate the lobbying restrictions. Even under the Christian 
Echoes balancing test,244 the LDS campaign in favor of traditional 
marriage likely did not represent a substantial part of the Church’s 
overall activities. As Douglas Callister argued, “The church’s 
involvement with political issues is rare and does not involve a 
significant fraction of its total activities and assets when one considers 
the substantial resources committed by the church to missionary 
work, temple and meeting-house construction and maintenance, 
family history, education and so forth.”245 One might argue that 
because marriage is central to the LDS faith, any significant effort to 
shape public policy on such a key issue should be labeled 
“substantial.” However, the question is not whether the issue in 
question is central to a church’s religious tenets or even whether the 
 239. See supra Part II.B.2.c. 
 240. As discussed above, the IRS has never articulated the line between advocating the 
adoption or rejection of legislation and speaking out on important issues of public policy. See 
supra Part II.B.2.c. If the line is drawn at the mentioning of specific pieces of legislation, the 
Church likely attempted to influence legislation. However, such a bright-line rule would allow 
churches to simply avoid the harshness of the restrictions by doing anything except specifically 
mentioning the legislation by name. 
 241. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii)(b) (as amended in 1990). 
 242. If the activities are properly classified as attempts to influence legislation, the 
question then becomes whether those activities were a substantial part of the organization’s 
overall activities. See supra Part II. 
 243. One calculation put the cost of sending the first letter at only $52.47. Elias, supra 
note 226; see also note 225 and accompanying text (providing 1997 estimates of the church’s 
total assets and annual expenditures). 
 244. See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 245. Coile, supra note 226. 
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activities themselves could be labeled as “substantial.” Rather, the 
test is whether the lobbying activities constitute a substantial part of 
a church’s overall activities. In sum, “[t]here is no prohibition on a 
church becoming involved in an insubstantial way [o]n an issue that 
is central to the religion.”246
Still, while the Church’s tax-exempt status was not endangered 
in this instance, the ambiguity of the lobbying restrictions and empty 
threats of stripping tax-exempt status may have had a silencing effect 
even on the LDS Church. For example, the limited nature of the 
Church’s efforts in California demonstrates the chilling effect that 
ambiguous lobbying restrictions have on religious speech. More 
significantly, the LDS Church has not engaged in similar direct 
communications with its members regarding specific legislative 
proposals since the Proposition 22 debate. This lack of internal 
instruction on specific issues might indicate that the repeated and 
unsubstantiated threats of removing the Church’s tax-exempt status 
during the California initiative may have had at least some effect in 
reducing the Church’s involvement in similar, more recent initiatives. 
3. Utah’s Amendment Three and the Federal Marriage Amendment 
During the recent debate over Utah’s Amendment Three247 and 
the Federal Marriage Amendment, the Church returned to its model 
of issuing statements of principle in the form of press releases—this 
time articulating the Church’s position on constitutional 
amendments defining marriage in two statements by the Church’s 
First Presidency.248 However, in neither of these statements did the 
 246. Elias, supra note 226 (quoting Douglas Callister). 
 247. Amendment Three to the Utah Constitution, which became effective on January 1, 
2005, reads as follows: “(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union between a man and a 
woman; (2) No other domestic union, however denominated, may be recognized as a marriage 
or given the same or substantially equivalent legal effect.” UTAH CONST. art. I, § 29. 
 248. The first statement by the Church read as follows: “The Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints favors a constitutional amendment preserving marriage as the lawful union of 
a man and a woman.” LDS.org, First Presidency Issues Statement on Marriage, July 7, 2004, 
http://lds.org/newsroom/showrelease/0,15503,4028-1-19733,00.html. The statement 
qualified this position with the comment that it was simply “a statement of principle in 
anticipation of the expected debate over same-gender marriage [and] not an endorsement of 
any specific amendment.” Id. Three months later, the second statement offered doctrinal 
support as well as a clearer delineation of the Church’s position: 
  We of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints reach out with 
understanding and respect for individuals who are attracted to those of the same 
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Church offer its support for a particular amendment, nor did the 
Church indicate whether these statements referred to either a state or 
federal marriage amendment. Unlike the Church’s previous political 
battles regarding the definition of marriage, the Church did not ask 
anyone to raise money independently. Also, the Church itself did not 
offer any monetary support to the passage of Amendment Three as 
the Church had in Hawaii and Alaska. 
Despite the relatively innocuous nature of these press releases, 
they again raise the question of whether official church statements to 
the public constitute attempts to influence legislation. While the 
Church was clearly taking a strong stance in the middle of a hot 
political debate, the statements do not refer to any specific 
legislation, although they do refer to a specific category of 
legislation—constitutional amendments. Some might question the 
timing of the statements because the Church issued the first just 
before the U.S. Senate was scheduled to vote on a federal marriage 
amendment249 and issued the second just two weeks before Utahans 
were to vote on Amendment Three.250 Once again, however, such 
statements do not involve any significant costs or time in preparation 
or delivery. They are simply declarations of the Church’s doctrinal 
stance on an important public policy issue related to the sanctity and 
preservation of traditional marriage.251 As such, these declarations of 
official church positions on policy issues likely do not come within 
the purview of the lobbying restrictions. Even if these statements did 
gender. We realize there may be great loneliness in their lives but there must also be 
recognition of what is right before the Lord. 
  As a doctrinal principle, based on sacred scripture, we affirm that marriage 
between a man and a woman is essential to the Creator’s plan for the eternal destiny 
of His children. The powers of procreation are to be exercised only between a man 
and a woman lawfully wedded as husband and wife. 
  Any other sexual relations, including those between persons of the same 
gender, undermine the divinely created institution of the family. The Church 
accordingly favors measures that define marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman and that do not confer legal status on any other sexual relationship. 
LDS.org, First Presidency Statement on Same-Gender Marriage, Oct. 19, 2004, 
http://lds.org/newsroom/showrelease/0,15503,4028-1-20336,00.html. See also Rebecca 
Walsh, LDS Church Shuns Political Fight over Utah’s Marriage Amendment, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Aug. 30, 2004, at B1; Rebecca Walsh, LDS Church Issues Edict on Marriage, SALT LAKE TRIB., 
Oct. 20, 2004, at B1. 
 249. See Walsh, LDS Church Shuns Political Fight over Utah’s Marriage Amendment, 
supra note 248. 
 250. See Walsh, LDS Church Issues Edict on Marriage, supra note 248. 
 251. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
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constitute attempts to influence legislation, they clearly would not 
have caused the Church to cross the substantiality threshold for its 
overall lobbying activities. 
C. Direct Lobbying Efforts and the Flat Tax Issue 
Finally, an analysis of the LDS Church’s involvement in the 
political arena is not complete without mentioning the infrequent 
direct lobbying efforts in which the Church engages. Very rarely, 
Church attorneys, lobbyists, or other officers will communicate 
directly with legislators regarding specific public policy issues. The 
central issue is whether church contacts with legislators is for the 
purpose of persuading or educating—the lobbying restrictions 
covering the former but not the latter.252
This practice recently came under scrutiny when attorneys for the 
Church directly contacted Utah legislators over proposals to scrap 
the charitable donation deduction and implement a flat tax.253 Some 
have questioned the propriety of this and similar moves because a 
majority of the members of the Utah legislature are also members of 
the LDS Church.254 Prefacing these communications with another 
public statement regarding the Church’s position on the matter, 
Church spokesman Dale Bills said that the motivation for supporting 
the continuation of the deduction was broader than the Church’s 
own interest in providing an incentive for its members to pay 
tithing.255 Thus, the Church did not necessarily disagree with the 
adoption of a flat tax in Utah, but rather the abolition of the 
charitable gift deduction in conjunction with the new tax regime.256
 252. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Bob Bernick, Jr., Flat Tax Issue Puts LDS Legislators in a Bind, DESERET NEWS, 
Sept. 2, 2005, at A19. The flat tax would replace Utah’s current graduated income tax. 
 254. See Bob Bernick, Jr., LDS Church Lobbying on Taxes, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 1, 2005 
(“More than 80 percent of the 104 part-time legislators are members of the LDS Church.”). 
Still, legislators have described “the limited amount of contact there is between the [C]hurch 
and the legislature.” Dillon, supra note 214 (quoting Utah House Speaker Marty Stephens). 
 255. See Bob Bernick, Jr., Utah Ponders Flat Tax, DESERET NEWS, May 27, 2005, at A1 
(“For the overall good of the citizenry, the state tax system should continue to provide tax 
deductions for charitable giving—including religious contributions. Charitable contributions 
help provide for society’s poor and needy, education and the arts, and other important social 
needs.”). This statement was not issued as an official declaration by the First Presidency of the 
Church but by Church spokesman Dale Bills. Id. 
 256. See Bernick, supra note 254. 
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Similar to previous political activities of the Church, these official 
statements and even the direct lobbying of legislators did not rise to 
the level of a substantial portion of the Church’s overall activities. 
Nonetheless, the Church’s involvement in the flat-tax issue raises 
some interesting questions in relation to the lobbying restrictions. 
First, to what extent may churches lobby on activities that directly 
affect their own rights, powers, and obligations? Although the tax 
code offers protection for certain tax-exempt entities that lobby 
public officials on issues directly affecting their rights, these 
provisions specifically exclude churches from their coverage.257 Even 
if the IRS would not enforce strict interpretations of the lobbying 
restrictions against such lobbying efforts on issues directly affecting 
churches’ rights, both Congress and the IRS should amend the law 
to extend these protections to churches. A second issue concerns 
communications by church officials with legislators who happen to 
be members of that church. May a church informally communicate 
important positions to church members who are in a position to 
more effectively advocate that position during a legislative process? 
These are just a few of the several questions that remain unanswered 
under the current state of the law. 
In summary, the LDS Church’s efforts at political advocacy 
provide an excellent template for analyzing the lobbying restrictions. 
Although this overview of the Church’s political activities may give 
the impression that the Church is often engaged in considerable 
lobbying, the fact is that these instances are rare and amount to only 
a small fraction of the Church’s overall religious mission throughout 
the world.258 Nonetheless, though minimal and infrequent, the 
Church’s efforts are effective because of the generally loyal reaction 
of its members.259 The LDS Church’s efforts to shape public policy is 
demonstrative of how other churches that are not otherwise 
politically active may make their voices heard in the political arena 
without endangering their tax-exempt status. 
Nonetheless, because neither the IRS nor Congress has made it 
absolutely clear that such internal church correspondence and 
 257. See supra notes 79, 95 (explaining that because churches cannot make an election 
under § 501(h), the definitions offering these protections in § 4911 do not apply to churches). 
 258. See supra note 213. 
 259. “[I]t is the very infrequency of Mormon mobilization that accentuates its 
effectiveness. Because LDS Church leaders rarely speak out on explicitly political questions, 
when they do Mormons sit up and take notice.” Dry Kindling, supra note 194, at 29. 
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direction from church leaders falls outside the scope of § 501(c)(3)’s 
lobbying restraints, churches will continue to be extremely hesitant 
to communicate with members about any issue that is or has been 
debated in the political realm. Further, groups opposed to church 
involvement in shaping public policy will continue to threaten 
churches with loss of tax-exempt status for engaging in these 
communicative activities. Churches must be free to engage in open 
and free communication with members and parishioners regarding 
important religious and moral issues of public policy such as the 
definition of marriage. Accordingly, the lobbying restrictions should 
be clarified to allow churches to educate members regarding such 
issues and encourage members to get involved in the political 
processes that determine the outcome of these issues. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This analysis has shown that the discrepancies inherent in the 
lobbying restrictions of § 501(c)(3) have been a great source of 
confusion and concern in the religious community. However, 
churches seeking to retain an independent voice in shaping public 
policy need not fear the empty threats of separationist groups 
because (1) the IRS has never revoked a church’s tax-exempt status 
solely for violating the lobbying restrictions and (2) the lobbying 
restrictions likely do not regulate internal church teaching or 
communication regarding public policy. Nonetheless, these 
ambiguities have had the effect of not only removing some religious 
influences from government policymaking but also subtly shaping 
religious belief by giving the false impression that too much religious 
speech about political issues is somehow inappropriate or unlawful. 
These problems highlight the need for lawmakers to clarify the 
extent to which churches may engage in lobbying efforts and what 
activities constitute attempts to influence legislation. The example of 
the LDS Church provides at least some indication that churches can 
engage in advocacy efforts on moral issues without jeopardizing their 
tax-exempt status. Nonetheless, Congress and the IRS should act to 
protect internal church relationships by excluding communications 
between church leaders and members from the scope of the lobbying 
restrictions. Such guidelines would protect the right of churches to 
teach their members the moral and religious implications of modern 
public policy issues and to encourage members to get involved in the 
political processes affecting those issues. 
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Thus, a proper interpretation of the lobbying restrictions of § 
501(c)(3) can preserve the autonomy of church and state by 
respecting both internal church relationships and the integrity of the 
revenue system. However, this result is possible only if the 
government’s interpretation of the lobbying restrictions recognizes 
the reality that “[c]hurches exist in part to teach morality and 
influence behavior.”260 The purpose of applying the lobbying 
restrictions to churches has never been to prevent religious beliefs 
from influencing public policy, but rather to ferret out those 
organizations that would abuse their tax-exempt status to promote a 
purely nonreligious political agenda under the guise of religion. 
Accordingly, the law must recognize the rights of churches and 
church leaders to teach members about important policy issues and 
urge members to apply their religious beliefs by participating in the 
political process.  
With numerous moral issues on the political horizon at both the 
state and federal level—ranging from attempts to change the legal 
definition of marriage to the widespread use of pornography—
America cannot afford to reject its religious heritage in the policy-
making process. As John Adams famously declared, “[W]e have no 
government armed with power capable of contending with human 
passions unbridled by morality and religion. . . . Our constitution 
was made only for a moral and religious people. It is wholly 
inadequate to the government of any other.”261 Thus, without a 
narrow interpretation of the lobbying restrictions that protects the 
relationship between a church and its members, society would lose 
one of its most stabilizing forces, and churches would be bereaved of 
their historic and fundamental role in shaping public policy to reflect 
the religious values of America’s citizens. 
 260. Ablin, supra note 11, at 587–88. “Though it may not always be wise for a church to 
become politically active, at times a church will feel compelled to become involved in its 
pursuit of justice.” Id. at 588. 
 261. 9 JOHN ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 229 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1854) (address to the military on Oct. 11, 1798). 
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